The New Post 9/11 America or the Making of King George: A Review of Executive Power in the Effort to Combat Global Terrorism as It Relates to the Power of the Purse by Turner, Woodrow E.
Volume 106 Issue 2 Article 9 
January 2004 
The New Post 9/11 America or the Making of King George: A 
Review of Executive Power in the Effort to Combat Global 
Terrorism as It Relates to the Power of the Purse 
Woodrow E. Turner 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, National Security 
Law Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Woodrow E. Turner, The New Post 9/11 America or the Making of King George: A Review of Executive 
Power in the Effort to Combat Global Terrorism as It Relates to the Power of the Purse, 106 W. Va. L. Rev. 
(2004). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol106/iss2/9 
This Student Work is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research 
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The 
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
THE NEW POST 9/11 AMERICA OR THE MAKING OF
KING GEORGE: A REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE POWER
IN THE EFFORT TO COMBAT GLOBAL TERRORISM
AS IT RELATES TO THE POWER OF THE PURSE
I. INTRO DUCTION ...................................................................................... 446
II. HISTORICAL AMERICAN UNPREPAREDNESS FOR CRISIS
AND SUBSEQUENT KNEEJERK REACTIONS ........................................... 447
III. POST 9/11 AMERICAN REACTIONS ........................................................ 453
IV. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE ............................................. 457
A . The B asics ................................................................................ 457
B. The Executive Power - Somewhat Less than a
K ing .......................................................................................... 4 5 8
C. Foreign Affairs and Warmaking Powers of the
E xecutive .................................................................................. 46 1
D. The Spending Power and the Budget ....................................... 463
1. The Power of the Purse ............................................... 463
2. The Budget Process ..................................................... 464
3. The Iran-Contra Affair - A Look at
Presidential Assertion of the Spending
P ow er .......................................................................... 469
V. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE ......................................................... 470
A. O rigins of the D octrine ............................................................ 471
B. High Water Mark of the Doctrine ............................................ 472
C. M odem Delegation Theory ...................................................... 475
VI. DELEGATION OF THE SPENDING POWER? SOMETHING
HAS TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL SOMETIME! ....................................... 478
A. Intelligible Principles with a Twist .......................................... 482
1. The Schoenbrod Doctrine ........................................... 482
2. An Agency Formatted Intelligible
Principle? ..................................... . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . 484
B. State Nondelegation Doctrines ................................................ 485
C. D elegation Canons .................................................................. 486
D . A N ew Standard ....................................................................... 488
V II. C O NCLU SIO N ......................................................................................... 492
1
Turner: The New Post 9/11 America or the Making of King George: A Review
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2004
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Freedom is never more than one generation away from extinc-
tion - we didn't pass it on to our children in the bloodstream. It
must be fought for, protected, and handed on for them to do the
same, or one day we will spend our sunset years telling our
children and our children's children what it was once like in the
United States when men were free.'
I. INTRODUCTION
December 7, 1941. Japanese Zeros reign death from the skies above
Pearl Harbor. November 22, 1963. A young President and symbol of hope is
shot down in his prime. September 11, 2001. America's biggest buildings in
her biggest city are destroyed by jet liners turned into human missiles.
Americans remember these dates, where they were, and what they were
doing when they heard tragic and life changing news. Shortly after the fall of
the Twin Towers in New York City, our leaders debated the proper course of
action to meet a new transnational threat to our way of life. Part of the congres-
sional reaction to the terrorist attacks of September I lth was to draft legislation
providing for the establishment of a new Department of Homeland Security to
coordinate planning, preparedness, and reaction to internal strikes against the
United States. Language in the House version of the bill gave the President of
the United States broad, unlimited discretion to spend funds in the manner that
he, and only he, saw fit. These "new powers," designed to allow for quick deci-
sive actions to meet as of yet undefined attacks on America, would have in-
fringed upon the delicately wrought separation of powers contained in the
United States Constitution by usurping Congress's most effective check on tyr-
anny - the power of the purse - the backbone of any effective legislation.
In contemplating ceding a portion of their "power of the purse" to the
executive, Congress, the people's representatives, continued a pattern of post-
crises responses to both external and internal dangers. All too often in our na-
tion's history we have seen the pattern of first, a clear threat, and second, reac-
tionary governmental response that threatens our civil liberties or the framework
of the Constitution. Fortunately, despite immense growth of executive power in
the twentieth century and especially after the September I I th attacks, Congress
avoided the dangerous precedent of ceding their power of the purse which
would have effectively set the stage for unlimited further executive growth.
Although Congress and the American people avoided this constitutional tragedy,
Congress manifested a willingness to at least consider abandoning their tradi-
tional prerogatives and powers to the President. Congress's recent contempla-
tion and historical willingness to cede powers to the President shows that the
prophetic union of the purse and the sword is indeed upon us and requires judi-
I Ronald Reagan, Address at the Phoenix Chamber of Commerce (Mar. 30, 1961), in A TIME
FOR CHOOSING: THE SPEECHES OF RONALD REAGAN, 1961-1982, at 38 (Alfred A. Balitzer & Ge-
rald M. Bonetto eds., 1983).
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cial action to prevent continued erosion of the separation of powers. Despite
judicial reluctance to step in as an enforcer between Congress and the President,
an often overlooked string of judicial cases interpreting the nondelegation doc-
trine can be reinvigorated to force an acquiescing Congress to retain their most
powerful check on the executive - the power of the purse.
Part II of this paper will outline the historical infringements on civil lib-
erties and the Constitution in times of real or perceived failure. Part III is a brief
synopsis of the executive and legislative events since September 11, 2001, that
show that America continues to make the Constitution an expedient target in
times of need. A review of the separation of powers doctrine in relation to the
executive and legislative functions is examined in Part IV. Part V focuses on
the nondelegation history and reach of the nondelegation doctrine. Finally, Part
VI examines the doctrine's potential to combat unfettered delegation of the
spending power and proposes that a new reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine
could serve the purpose of restraining future delegations of the power of the
purse to the executive.
II. HISTORICAL AMERICAN UNPREPAREDNESS FOR CRISIS
AND SUBSEQUENT KNEEJERK REACTIONS
The history of our country is filled with examples of adversity thrust
onto an unsuspecting and unwilling American populace. Many times, our peo-
ple and government have been steadfast in their desire to avoid conflict until a
foe has drawn American blood giving rise to a distinctive "American Way of
War.' 2 Due to a national distaste toward international involvement, our nation
2 The "American Way of War" as developed over the past 200 years is essentially a dual
system of engagement. First, in regards to international threats, the United States has been for a
large portion of our history very isolationist. When America is involved in international affairs,
the federal government generally attempts to find a negotiated resolution due to internal political
differences of opinion and a desire to avoid war, i.e., the classic battle between the hawks and the
doves. The second and final stage of the "American Way of War" is essentially the unleashing of
the might of the American military machine to an extent only limited by men, machines and
money or, in other terms, total war. Since World War II an intermediate step has developed that
has stressed international coalitions and gradual force investment. See generally Colonel Lloyd J.
Matthews, The Evolution of American Military Ideals, MILITARY REV., Jan.-Feb. 1998,
http:llwww-cgsc.army.millmilrev/EnglishlJanFeb98/matthews.htm (last updated Sept. 25, 2003).
In essence, US forces are imbued with the spirit of the offensive, characterized
by an indomitable will to win and an aggressive determination to carry the
battle to the enemy. Their aim is to inflict on the enemy an early and decisive
defeat. This spirit, while likely to produce a battlefield success, is often at
odds with the instincts of political leaders, who may prefer a more graduated
force application concurrent with diplomatic and other pressures. Paradoxi-
cally, once diplomacy fails and the Armed Forces are given their head, they
may have to move at a pace even faster than their own doctrine would dictate.
Political realities militate against protracted hostilities, so campaigns must be
concluded in the shortest time possible.
Id.; see also RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR, at xix (1973).
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has been caught woefully unprepared to meet threats we did not choose. 3 Sub-
sequently, federal government measures are usually quickly enacted to meet
these unforeseen threats head on.
Although these measures have been more or less successful to defeat the
current threat against our country and its values, the one consistent target for
post-attack government quasi and real legislation has been and continues to be
the United States Constitution. A pattern of first, a clear threat, and second,
reactionary government response that threatens either civil liberties or the
framework of the Constitution, is all too clear from our nation's history.
Recently, our nation was once again attacked. Our leaders responded in
quick and resolute terms. However, as horrible as the World Trade Center tow-
ers plummet to earth was, it is imperative to remember that the United States has
been down this road before. Just as Rome was not built in a day, our Constitu-
tion and civil liberties were not eroded in a day. Looking at the historical crises
that America has been confronted with since the time of the revolution to the
present day, it is easy to see the steady erosion of our constitutional separation
of powers and civil liberties. As such, the post-September 1 th reactions of
Congress and the President to shift power to the executive were predictable and
indeed commonplace.4
The conflict between wartime exigencies and civil liberties began while
the guns of the Revolution still raged. During the Revolution, Virginia Gover-
The only kind of American strategy employing the armed forces tended to be
the most direct kind of military strategy, applied in war .... During the Cold
War and especially after the Korean War, the belief that the United States was
involved in a protracted conflict with international Communism led to a de-
parture from historic habits and to an effort to form a national strategy for the
employment of American power in defense and promotion of the country's
political values and interests.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see Francis J. West, Jr., American Security Doctrine: An Historical Per-
spective, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 475-83 (John Norton Moore et al. eds., 1990).
3 Historically, America has been an isolationist country opposed to foreign military affairs.
Admittedly, this reactive national outlook has changed considerably in the past few decades with
American humanitarian and police efforts increasing in the post-Cold War era. America now is
applying a proactive anti-terrorist dogma in foreign affairs. See, e.g., Anthony Dworkin, Iraq and
the "Bush Doctrine" of Pre-Emptive Self-Defense, at http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/bush-
intro.html (Aug. 20, 2002).
4 See generally ROBERT HIGGS, Preface to CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN, CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE
GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, at ix (1987).
There was a time, long ago, when the average American could go about his
daily business hardly aware of the government - especially the federal gov-
ernment .... Those days, alas, are long gone. Now, in virtually every dimen-
sion, our lives revolve within rigid limits circumscribed by governmental au-
thorities; we are constrained continually and on all sides by Big Government.
Regulations clutter the landscape. Governmental spending equals almost four-
tenths of the gross national product.
[Vol. 106
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nor Thomas Jefferson supported an act to establish internment camps for politi-
cally suspect citizens. 5 When Patrick Henry was governor of Virginia, the
"Give-Me-Liberty-or-Give-Me-Death" patriot secured the passage of a bill of
attainder for the arrest of a Tory leader.6 These examples show an early ten-
dency for government leaders to infringe upon civil liberties when necessary to
meet a threat to America. The actions of Jefferson and Henry also foreshadow
subsequent federal reactions in times of war after ratification.
Shortly after the ratification of the Constitution and peace with Britain,
the young republic was thrust into world conflict unprepared. Troubles in the
Mediterranean Sea with the Barbary pirates led to the reestablishment of the
Navy in 1794.7 Then, the revolutionary government of France discontinued
diplomatic relations with the United States over a trade agreement the United
States had signed with Britain.8 French warships began to prey on American
trading ships leading to the Quasi-War with France.9 These threats led Congress
to pass the Alien and Sedition Acts and the Naturalization Act.'0 Although the
reestablishment of the Navy and building of ships was authorized by acts of
Congress," the lack of preparedness for conflict and quick federal onslaughts on
civil liberties highlighted by the countries early difficulties with France would
5 Ira Meistrich, Freedoms Under Siege, MHQ: Q.J. MILITARY HIST., Winter 2003, at 46, 48.
6 Id. A "tory" is defined as "an American upholding the cause of the British Crown against
the supporters of colonial independence during the American Revolution." WEBSTER'S NINTH
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1246 (Frederick C. Mish ed., 1988).
7 NAVAL HISTORICAL CTR., DEP'T OF THE NAVY, THE REESTABLISHMENT OF THE NAVY, 1787-
1801, at http://www.history.navy.mil/biblio/biblio4/biblio4a.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003) [here-
inafter REESTABLISHMENT OF THE NAVY].
8 Id.
9 See id.; Meistrich, supra note 5, at 49. For a complete history of the Quasi-War, see
ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 145-66 (1976).
10 Naturalization Act, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (1798); Alien Enemies Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570
(1798); Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798); Sedition Acts, ch. 74, I Stat. 596 (1798)
(collectively referred to as Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798); Naturalization Act of 1790, I Stat.
103, amended by Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414; Meistrich, supra note 5, at 49. Cumula-
tively, these acts "required that aliens be residents for 14 years instead of 5 years before they
became eligible for U.S. citizenship," authorized the President to deport aliens "'dangerous to the
peace and safety of the United States' during peacetime," "allowed the wartime arrest, imprison-
ment and deportation of any alien resident of an enemy power," "declared that any treasonable
activity, including the publication of 'any false, scandalous and malicious writing,' was a high
misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment." The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, at
http://earlyamerica.com/earlyamerica/milestones/sedition/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2003). For further
discussion of the history and effect of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, see Akhil Reed Amar,
Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 502-03 (1991); for in-depth
treatment of the Alien and Sedition Acts, see JOHN CHESTER MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE
ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS (1951).
II REESTABLISHMENT OF THE NAVY, supra note 7, at http://www.history.navy.mil/biblio/
biblio4/biblio4a.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
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establish a pattern for American emergency response that we unfortunately still
see today.
The first great crisis of the new republic came when the nation was not
quite a century old and totally unprepared for an upcoming conflict. The elec-
tion of Republican Abraham Lincoln from Illinois proved to be the impetus a
sectionalized country needed to divide into open secession. Almost immedi-
ately, southern states declared the Union dissolved and set out to make a new
nation conceivably based upon the United States Constitution that the northern
Republicans had allegedly abandoned. 12
The departure of the southern states coupled with the passage of federal
troops through Baltimore created secession fervor in the state of Maryland.
These secessionist elements sought to prevent the reinforcement of Washington,
D.C. by blocking Union troop movements through the city of Baltimore. Ac-
tivities by southern sympathizers culminated on the night of April 19, 1861,
when they burned the key railroad bridges leading to Washington, D.C.13 Sub-
sequently, Lincoln, for the first time in the nation's still young history, sus-
pended the writ of habeas corpus on April 27, 1861, allowing the arrest of an
individual and their indefinite imprisonment. '
4
The writ of habeas corpus held a special place in the hearts of the
American public in the colonial and later antebellum period; the writ was the
only common law process expressly mentioned in the United States Constitu-
tion.' 5 Blackstone stated that habeas corpus is "a great and efficacious writ in
cases of illegal confinement."16 Our Supreme Court held, many years after the
Civil War, that the writ of habeas corpus is "the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action."' 17 Its
purpose is to "provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society
deems to be intolerable restraints." 8 In practice, the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus by Lincoln effectively allowed the arrest of an individual and
then the indefinite imprisonment of the individual detained. The suspension,
along the Washington to Baltimore railway, allowed Lincoln to take steps to
guarantee the safe passage of troops to protect Washington, D.C. As dramatic
and unconstitutional as this idea sounds, Lincoln's proclamation regarding the
suspension of the writ along the military line of the Washington to Baltimore
12 See generally I SHELBY FOOTE, THE CIVIL WAR: A NARRATIVE 3-5 (Vintage Books 1986).
13 MARK E. NEELEY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY 5 (1991).
14 Id. at 8.
15 Id. at xiv; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
16 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW 562 (Bernard C. Gavit
ed., Washington Law Books 1941) (1892).
17 Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969).
18 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S.
1 (1992).
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railway was not an isolated event during his presidency. During the course of
the war, it is estimated that over 13,000 civilians were imprisoned by the Lin-
coln administration. 19 Lincoln, pro-Union governors and Union supporters used
the nationwide suspension to jail pro-Confederate and anti-war elements such as
newspaper editors.
Many years later, American entry into World War I precipitated another
rapid expansion of executive power to guarantee victory. Congress gave Presi-
dent Woodrow Wilson wide authority to control prices, rents, transportation and
manufacturing. 20 Congress also passed various acts to reduce dissention among
the American populace. These acts included the Selective Service Act, which
authorized the imprisonment of anyone opposing the draft.21 Also, another Se-
dition Act was passed during the war which banned undesirable activity. 22 All
told, the rapid growth of government, intrinsically necessary to mobilize the
American economy and military on a global scale for entry into World War I,
provided a precedent for executive growth that continues today - then and now,
23
all in the name of victory and expediency.
The "great peace" following the "great war" was broken by depression
and unemployment. Strikes by jobless workers and bombings by Communists,
anarchists and others led to widespread government wiretaps and raids leading
to over 6,000 arrests.24 Widespread support for the Constitution and civil liber-
ties followed the Great Depression in the 1930s. 25 However, events in late 1941
brought an abrupt end to peace, new legislation, and exercises of executive
power to guarantee a proper wartime response to the Axis threat.
Perhaps nothing from World War II exemplifies the unconstitutional re-
action of our government to the Axis threat than the much-maligned decision of
Korematsu v. United States.26 The petitioner in Korematsu was convicted for
19 NEELEY, supra note 13, at 23.
20 Meistrich, supra note 5, at 52.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Inherently, the American experience in World War I showed the American government that
extraordinary efforts would be able to have extraordinary results. By shifting power to the Presi-
dent, the United States was able to mobilize an economy, mobilize manpower, and train and pro-
vide for an army that distinguished itself against the historically better prepared Continental ar-
mies. When the Great Depression threatened America a mere decade later, the men called upon to
address the depression were some of the same men who helped guide the country through the
Great War. They looked to the model of a wartime executive used in World War I to meet this
new contingency and used the model of a powerful wartime executive to pull the country out of
recession.
24 Meistrich, supra note 5, at 52.
25 Id.
26 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See Micah H. Herzig, Note, Is Korematsu Good Law in the Face of
Terrorism? Procedural Due Process in the Security Versus Liberty Debate, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
2004]
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violating a Civilian Exclusion Order promulgated by the Commanding General
of the Western Defense Command under authority of an executive order.27 The
Civilian Exclusion Order prohibited Japanese-Americans in certain west coast
military areas so as to prevent espionage and sabotage by Japanese-Americans
during the opening months of World War 11.28
In upholding Korematsu's conviction for violating the Civilian Exclu-
sion Order, the Court placed great weight on the belief that there were certain
disloyal elements of the Japanese population in America. 29 Furthermore, the
shores of America were in direct threat of invasion by the Empire of Japan.
Therefore, because "hardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of
hardships" the impact of the Order on a group of citizens or a citizen like Kore-
matsu was justified in light of the exigent threat to the American shores. 30
World War II led directly into a heightened state of national readiness to
meet the enduring Soviet threat in the Cold War. To meet the danger the Soviet
Union posed to the American way of life, the House of Representatives set up
the House Unamerican Activities Committee in 1948, ushering in the age of
McCarthyism. 31 Senator Joseph McCarthy from Wisconsin and his roving
committee went on a witch-hunt for communists, required loyalty oaths, and
proliferated blacklists. 32 The undeclared Cold War from 1945 to the 1980s saw
a heightened state of peace that helped cement the figure of a strong executive
branch in the American psyche but few dramatic tragedies that gave rise to
large-scale infringements on civil liberties. However, this all changed in Sep-
tember 2001 with the terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, D.C., and
Pennsylvania.
These snippets of American history show the general pattern of Ameri-
can crises reaction. First, for all of the intellectual think-tanks and government
funding, the United States is generally woefully unprepared for a sudden threat
or attack. And, second, after an attack, the federal government is quick to pass
legislation or issue orders that infringe on the civil liberties of Americans and
the delicately wrought separation of powers contained in the Constitution. Any-
thing more than a cursory look at the events subsequent to September I 1th
shows that the reaction of the American people and Congress was no different
now than the reactions of our forefathers many years ago.
685 (2002), for a more detailed analysis of the Korematsu decision and its relevance for the War
on Terrorism.
27 Korenatsu, 323 U.S. at 216-17.
28 Id. at 217.
29 Id. at 218.
30 Id. at 219.
31 Meistrich, supra note 5, at 55.
32 Id. at 55.
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III. POST 9/11 AMERICAN REACTIONS
There can be no doubt that on September 11, 2001, our nation was ruth-
lessly attacked by extremists "hell-bent" on striking the heart, spirit, and resolve
of the American people. The unexpected assault on the American civilian popu-
lace immediately threw the entire country into a panic. Subsequent to the terror-
ist attacks on September 11, 2001, the government of the United States was
quick to react to the terrorist threat. On September 14, 2001, President Bush
declared a state of emergency and set the stage for the calling of reserve armed
forces. 33 Shortly after the attacks, President Bush created the Office of Home-
land Security by executive order 34 and appointed Pennsylvania Governor Tom
Ridge to be director of the newly created executive office.35 Later, President
Bush used an executive order to declare that noncitizens detained in the War on
Terrorism would be tried by military tribunal.36
Shortly thereafter, the Bush administration scored a major anti-terrorism
victory with the passage of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
("PATRIOT Act" or "Act") on October 26, 2001.37 The PATRIOT Act central-
izes federal law enforcement authority in the Justice Department.38 It gives the
government roving wiretap authority and increases penalties for terrorism-
related crimes. 39 In addition, the Act removes barriers to the passage of infor-
mation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies, gives the Attorney
General broad powers to detain and deport aliens with suspected terrorist ties,
and grants surveillance authority to federal law enforcement agencies.4n
33 Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001).
_ Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,812 (Oct. 8, 2001).
35 See Gerry J. Gilmore, Ridge Sworn in as Director of Homeland Security Office,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct200l/n 10082001_200110084.html (Oct. 8, 2001).
36 See William S. Morrow, Jr., National Security & Individual Rights: Striking the Right Bal-
ance in the Rules Governing Military Tribunals, ADMIN. & REG. LAW NEWS, Spring 2002, at 8, 8.
37 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C.A.). With a name so politically charged following so close to the heals of a national catas-
trophe, it is no wonder the bill passed so easily despite its reputed defects and threats to liberty.
38 See John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for "Home-
land Security": A Constitutional Analysis of the USA PATRIOT ACT and the Justice Depart-
ment's Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1088 (2002).
39 Id. at 1105, 1119.
40 See generally Eric L. Mueller, 12/7 and 9/11: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of History,
104 W. VA. L. REV. 571 (2002). It should be noted that the broad discrimination of the World
War II era against Japanese-Americans epitomized by the Korematsu case has been somewhat
avoided in the War on Terrorism. This includes Muslim-Americans detained under the new legis-
lation in both scope and numbers, treatment of captured AI-Qaeda fighters being given Geneva
convention rights, and a civilianized military tribunal system. Id.
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After the passage of the PATRIOT Act, the United States government
made further strides in the War on Terrorism. United States and coalition mili-
tary forces began attacking Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 .41 Through a series
of quick and relatively bloodless military actions, coalition forces succeeded in
destroying the terrorist elements controlling the country and establishing an in-
terim government. 42 Even though AI-Qaeda was effectively culled from Af-
ghanistan as a terrorist organization, the diffuse nature of terrorist activities and
the now obvious weaknesses of the United States government showed the need
for permanent changes in government organization and practices to meet con-
tinued terrorist threats.43 After much debate, Congress passed a law to create a
new Department of Homeland Security.44 President Bush signed the bill to cre-
ate the new department on November 25, 2002.45
Despite the immense shift in power to the executive in this century and
especially the months after the September 11 th terrorist attacks, Congress once
again passed extraordinary legislation that grants the executive department new
tools for the War on Terrorism and arguably infringes upon civil liberties.46
41 U.S., Britain Strike Afghanistan, USA TODAY, Oct. 7, 2001, http://www.usatoday.com/
news/sept I 1/2001/I 0/07/usattack.htm.
42 See Afghanistan Timeline, at http://www.mapreport.com/countries/afghanistan.html (Nov.
5, 2003), for a chronological history of the war in Afghanistan.
43 See OFFICE OF PRESS SEC'Y, THE WHITE HOUSE, REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT IN ADDRESS TO
THE NATION, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020606-8.html (June 6,
2002).
44 The power of the President to reorganize the departments in the executive branch has un-
dergone significant changes during the twentieth century. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S
GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENT 990 (Michael Nelson ed., 1989) [hereinafter GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENT].
Originally, executive reorganizations were subject to the approval of Congress. Id. However,
three subsequent acts of Congress, the Overman Act, Pub. L. No. 65-152, 40 Stat. 556 (1918), the
Reorganization Acts of 1939, ch. 36, 53 Stat. 561 (formerly codified at 5 U.S.C. § 133), and the
Reorganization Act of 1949, ch. 226, 63 Stat. 203 (current version as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-
912), gradually gave the. President more and more power to reorganize in accordance with presi-
dential prerogatives. See GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENT, supra, at 990. The Reorganization Act of
1949 allowed the President to reorganize the executive department subject to congressional veto.
See generally Reorganization Act of 1949, ch. 226, 63 Stat. 203; GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENT, supra,
at 990. For a time, the executive was given the authority to reorganize at-will and even create
cabinet-level departments unless either house of Congress vetoed the proposed organization
within sixty days. See Reorganization Act of 1949, ch. 226, § 6(c), 63 Stat. 203, 205; GUIDE TO
THE PRESIDENT, supra, at 990. However, in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the Supreme
Court declared that legislative vetoes, such as the one written by Congress into the Reorganization
Act of 1949, were unconstitutional. See id. at 951-59; see also GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENT, supra, at
990. Because of this decision, Congress refused to renew the Reorganization Act of 1949. GUIDE
TO THE PRESIDENT, supra, at 990. Now all reorganizations of the executive branch are required to
be passed by both houses of Congress and signed by the president into law. See id.; see also 5
U.S.C. §§ 908-912 (2000).
45 See Richard W. Stevenson, Signing Homeland Security Bill: Bush Appoints Ridge as Secre-
tary, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2002, at Al.
46 See generally Whitehead & Aden, supra note 38, at 1088.
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Notwithstanding these statutory grants of power, Congress considered, but man-
aged to avoid, perhaps the most dangerous shift of power contemplated in the
wake of September 11 th: the express abandonment of Congress's power of the
47purse to the executive. The bill that passed the House of Representatives was
written to give the President broad control over a considerable amount of the
proposed department's budget.48 During the debates of Congress surrounding
47 See David S. Broder, Yeoman Service on Homeland Security, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2002,
at A29, stating that "the reorganization plan embodies an enormous grant of presidential power:
control of 170,000 federal jobs and a big chunk of future budgets." See also Dan K. Thomasson,
Don't Create Homeland Security in Haste, DESERT NEWS, at AA06, stating:
In its pursuit of enemies, the new department would be able to shift
money among its various bureaus without the approval of Congress. Its em-
ployees would be subject to instant removal, with none of the protections of
the civil service system that safeguard other government workers.
The department would be as much on a permanent wartime alert as any
of the military services, and would have less congressional oversight that the
uniformed forces.
48 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. § 733(b).
Transfer of Appropriations: Except as otherwise specifically provided by law,
not to exceed five percent of any appropriation available to the Secretary in
any fiscal year may be transferred between such appropriations, except that
not less than fifteen days' notice shall be given to the Committees on Appro-
priations of the Senate and House of Representatives before any such transfer
is made.
Id. (introduced June 24, 2002). This section of the bill was cut out in the final bill. See Homeland
Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. (enacted). The Homeland Security Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (to be codified at 6 U.S.C. § 101) provides for more
traditional spending provisions. Section 874 of the Act provides:
(a) In General - Each budget request submitted to Congress for the Depart-
ment under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, shall, at or about the
same time, be accompanied by a Future Years Homeland Security Program.
(b) Contents - The Future Years Homeland Security Program under subsec-
tion (a) shall be structured, and include the same type of information and level
of detail as the Future Years Defense Program submitted to Congress by the
Department of Defense under subsection 221 of title 10, United States Code.
(c) Effective Date - This section shall take effect with respect to the prepara-
tion and submission of the fiscal year 2005 budget request for the Department
and for any subsequent fiscal year, except that the first Future Years Home-
land Security Program shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the De-
partment's fiscal year 2005 budget request is submitted to Congress.
Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 874. See also Section 889(a) amending 31 U.S.C. §
1105(a) by adding the following:
(33)(A)(i) a detailed, separate analysis, by budget function, by agency, and by
initiatives area (as determined by the administration) for the prior fiscal year,
the current fiscal year, the fiscal years for which the budget is submitted, and
the ensuing fiscal year identifying the amounts of gross and net appropriations
or obligational authority and outlays that contribute to homeland security, with
separate displays for mandatory and discretionary amounts ....
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the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, Senator Robert C. Byrd
stated:
In the name of homeland security, Congress must not be per-
suaded to grant broad authorities to the administration that,
given more careful thought, we would not grant. The House
has already passed legislation to grant the President the author-
ity to waive worker protections for Federal employees, to place
the new Department's inspector general under the thumb of the
Homeland Security Secretary, to exempt the new Department
from public disclosure laws, and to chip away at congressional
control of the power of the purse. Close examination of the
President's plan shows that the administration is seeking more
new powers which, unchecked, might be used to compromise
the private lives of the American public. Congress must never
act so recklessly as to grant such broad statutory powers to any
President, even in the quest for something so vital as protection
of our own land. So vital, the war on terror. We must exercise
great caution. We must operate with the clear knowledge that
once such powers are granted, they will reside in the White
House with future Presidents - Republican and Democrat - and
they will not be easily retrieved.49
Congressional battles spawning from speeches and sentiments such as these
from Senator Byrd helped him and other resolute senators from memorializing
an express grant of the power of the purse to the President in the wake of Sep-
tember 1 th.
However, although the legislative history after September 11 th can
serve as the present demarcation line in the battle between Congress and the
executive, the battle over the power of the purse is not over. To truly under-
stand the future threat of what Senator Byrd was so vehemently warning his
fellow senators about, one must understand the separation of powers doctrine as
promulgated by the framers and the distinct powers given to each branch of
government. Then, a look at how these powers overlap will show that the
spending power of Congress, so dearly won by Anglican ancestors, has already
(ii) with respect to subclauses (I) through (IV) of clause (i), amounts shall be
provided by account for each program, project and activity.
Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 889(a). This language leaves none of the budgetary discretion
contained in the House bill. In regards to transition from pre-Act organization to the new Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, the Act provides that a reorganization plan must be submitted by the
President within sixty days of enactment of the Act that specifies which funds will be transferred
to the new department as a result of the organization changes contained in the plan. See Home-
land Security Act of 2002 § 1502.
49 148 CONG. REC. S8,644-49 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2002) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
[Vol. 106
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 106, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol106/iss2/9
THE NEW POST 9/1 ! AMERICA
been incrementally forfeited to a large degree by our legislative branch. Indeed,
the threat Senator Byrd was warning his peers about has already occurred; the
good Senator was merely seeking to prevent the legislative abandonment of the
spending power from being etched into law. 50 In summation, this analysis will
show that judicial intervention is needed to (1) force Congress to reassert its
historical dominance over the power of the purse and (2) prevent Congress from
ever again contemplating an express grant of the power of the purse to the ex-
ecutive in the name of national emergency.
IV. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
A. The Basics
The separation of powers doctrine contained in the Constitution is not,
as commonly viewed, three branches of government exercising different powers
but rather, as created by the founders of the Constitution, more accurately de-
scribed as three "separated institutions sharing power. ' '5' The Constitution, in
short, provides a general structure for each of the three branches of government
so that each branch co-exists in cooperation and in conflict with the other
branches.52
This diffusion of power between the branches is one of the central prin-
ciples on which our country was founded.53 As declared by our Supreme Court,
the purpose of separating the powers of the government was to "diffuse[] power
the better to secure liberty. ' 4 Separating the powers between the three branches
of the government was thought to be one of the strongest safeguards against one
of the greatest threats to liberty: the concentration of power in one branch of
government.5 5 Because the doctrine is one that shares power rather than dis-
50 See generally id. For a discussion of the spending power and the budget see infra notes
104-159 and accompanying text.
51 GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 44, at 1089.
52 Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 27
(1985) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS].
53 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
5 Youngstown v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952).
55 See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 336 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 196 1)
stating, "No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of
more enlightened patrons of liberty, than that on which the objection is founded. The accumula-
tion of all powers ... in the same hands ... may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyr-
anny." See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 122 (1976) ("The Framers regarded the checks and
balances that they built into the tripartite Federal Government as a self-executing safeguard
against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.") Other
safeguards were thought to be the personal ambitions and motives of each branch and the Consti-
tutional provisions of veto, Congressional override and judicial independence. See, e.g., THE
FEDERALIST No. 5 1, at 289-90 (James Madison).
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tinctly separating it, the three branches frequently come into conflict. The Su-
preme Court takes a variety of approaches in deciding separation of powers is-
sues. The first approach is a textual approach, whereby the Court stresses the
meaning of the text of the Constitution.56 Second, the Court can decide a case
by looking at the original intent of the framers.57 Other approaches include
looking at the structure of the Constitution, institutional competencies, historical
practices and a value-based approach.58 For the sake of this argument, the reach
of the separation of powers doctrine is limited to those instances where the ex-
ecutive and legislative power overlap and come into conflict.
59
B. The Executive Power - Somewhat Less than a King
The executive power of the President stems directly from the United
States Constitution. The founding fathers had an ingrained fear of an overly
powerful executive. As such, they severely limited the power of the executive
under the Constitution's predecessor - the Articles of Confederation. However,
these executive limitations proved to be too extensive and the powers given to
the legislature proved too unwieldy to maintain a working national govern-
ment.6 ° Subsequently, the Constitutional Convention drafted a document that
provided for a more powerful executive and a more efficient voting scheme for
the Legislature. 61
Executive power must stem from the Constitution or from duly enacted
laws of Congress.62 Article I1 of the Constitution states, "The executive power
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. 63 The powers
granted to the executive contained in the Constitution include: Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces 64 and the power to make treaties. 65 In terms of law-
making powers, the President is limited to giving information of the state of the
union and recommending to Congress laws the President thinks "necessary and
56 See PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 27 (1988).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 As such, separation of powers battles between the legislature and the judiciary and the ex-
ecutive and the judiciary are not examined.
60 See SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 56, at 4-5.
61 See SOFAER, supra note 9, at 36-37.
62 See Youngstown v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952).
63 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. For a complete review of all aspects of executive power, see
generally SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 56.
64 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. I.
65 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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expedient. 66 Finally, before a bill may become law, the bill must be presented
to the President for approval or veto.67
Despite the fact that the Constitution limits the executive's lawmaking
powers to recommending laws or faithfully enacting the laws duly passed by
Congress, the executive has seen an immense gain of power in the twentieth
century.68 One of the most expansive uses of executive power is the use of ex-
ecutive orders to, in essence, make law; 69 to date, executive orders number over
13,000.70 Although executive orders have been used since the beginning of our
country, the abuse of this "lawmaking" method can be traced to this century.
For example, during the middle part of this century, President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt issued executive orders to the army to seize a steel plant.7' President
Roosevelt based his order not on any statutory authority but on the implied
powers given to the President by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces.72 In theory, executive orders are only a valid source of law when
they are issued under powers delegated by Congress in duly passed law or ema-
nated from the constitutional powers of the President contained in the Constitu-
tion.73 In response to these broad executive laws, the courts have, although
rarely, seen fit to overturn executive orders that lack statutory or constitutional
support.
74
Another gain in the executive's power in the last century has been the
expansion of executive rulemaking through administrative agencies.75 In terms
66 id. art. II, § 3.
67 Id. art 1, § 7, cl. 2.
68 See, e.g., William J. Olson & Alan Woll, Executive Orders and National Emergencies: How
Presidents Have Come to "Run the Country" by Usurping Legislative Power, CATO POL'Y
ANALYSIS 359, 1 (Oct. 28 1999), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa358.pdf (last visited Dec. 14,
2003).
69 See SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 56, at 88-89. Closely related to executive orders are execu-
tive proclamations. While it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between executive orders and
proclamations, as a general rule, orders apply to the executive's subordinates and proclamations
are given to the public at large. Id. at 88.
70 See Exec. Order No. 13,282, 68 Fed. Reg. 1,133 (Dec. 31, 2002).
71 See CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 52, at 128.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See id.; see also, e.g., Youngstown v Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Marks v. CIA, 590 F.2d
997, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Stevens v. Carey, 483 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1973).
75 See Nick Smith, Restoration of Congressional Authority and Responsibility over the Regu-
latory Process, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323 (1996). See generally WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 1-31 (1997) (describing administrative law in gen-
eral, including the functions of executive agencies, which include regulating private conduct,
rulemaking, adjudication, and investigations). Additionally, the work describes the provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). See id. at 23-27. Judicial review of agency action is
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of congressional oversight of executive agency actions through restrictions of
the power of the purse, the increased use of lump sum appropriations by Con-
gress gives the executive branch and its agencies very little guidance to perform
the branch's constitutional duty to execute the laws and promulgate rules.76
Therefore, Congress has developed procedures to control executive spending
and preserve its constitutional spending power. First, Congress provides admin-
istrative agencies with detailed committee reports dictating the specific amounts
agencies should spend on each program in the lump sum appropriation. 77 Agen-
cies in turn treat these committee reports almost as binding as statutory proscrip-
tions despite their questionable constitutional validity.78
Another method that Congress uses to maintain control over the execu-
tive branch is through a process called "reprogramming." Reprogramming is
"the use of funds for purposes other than those originally contemplated at the
time of appropriation., 79 This process involves agencies seeking permission
somewhat complicated. First, not all administrative actions are subject to judicial review. Id. at
27. The APA and federal common law further prohibit persons seeking redress from obtaining a
judicial resolution to the administrative action through the use of doctrines such as finality, ripe-
ness, and standing. Id. at 28. If a court does undertake judicial review of an agency decision, the
court must then determine what standard of review to employ. Id. The three standards of review
are de novo review, the "substantial evidence" standard, and finally, the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard. Id. When one considers the scope of private conduct regulated by administrative
agency and rulemaking, it is somewhat unsettling to think of the power possessed by these fairly
unaccountable parts of our government. Coupled with the numerous hurdles placed before parties
seeking judicial redress, the power of the modern administrative state and its resultant restrictions
on civil liberties is truly immense.
76 See infra notes 120-133 and accompanying text.
77 See John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radial Textualism,
Separation of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 489, 564 (2001); see
also WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE POWER OF
THE PURSE 62 (1994).
78 See Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 616 (1991) ("Petitioner does not - and obvi-
ously could not - contend that this statement in the Committee Reports has the force of law, for
the Constitution is quite explicit about the procedure that Congress must follow in legislating.");
Roberts, supra note 77, at 563 (citing the Comptroller General who said "indicia in committee
reports and other legislative history as to how funds should or are expected to be spent do not
establish any legal requirements on Federal agencies"). Roberts states that the reason executive
agencies treat the Committee Reports with such deference is that agency officials would be foolish
to defy Congressional Committees who control later appropriations. See Roberts, supra note 77,
at 564. Agencies are also bound by the Chevron Rule. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). This rule, briefly stated, is a two part test that first de-
termines if Congress has directly decided the issue in question. Id. at 842-43. If not, the second
inquiry then examines the agency interpretation to determine if it is reasonable. Id. If it is reason-
able, the agency determination is upheld. Id.
79 AARON WILDAVSKY & NAOMI CAIDEN, THE NEW POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 236
(3rd ed. 1997) (citing GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BUDGET REPROGRAMMING: DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE PROCESS FOR REPROGRAMMING FUNDS I (1986) (briefing report to the Honorable David
Pryor, United States Senate)).
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from congressional committees to spend more or less money than the specific
amount the committee detailed to be spent in their reports.80
C. Foreign Affairs and Warmaking Powers of the Executive
One of the President's broadest and most important powers is in the
realm of international affairs in his position as Commander-in-Chief; these pow-
ers stem from Article II of the Constitution.8 1 In United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp.,82 the Supreme Court went into great detail to decide that, in ex-
ternal affairs, the President is the "constitutional representative of the United
States with regard to foreign nations. 83 Furthermore, the sovereign power of
the United States in international affairs, such as the power to make treaties and
negotiate with foreign countries, was vested executive branch of the the federal
government of the United States.84 As such, the President, as the "sole organ in
the field of international relations," is given "a degree of discretion and freedom
from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs
alone involved." 85 Given this broad reading of presidential authority, Curtiss-
Wright has become a flagship case for blanket grants of approval by Congress
80 See Roberts, supra note 77 at 564.
81 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The exact scope of the President's power is hard to accurately
define; Congress and presidents have repeatedly fought over the shared power of warmaking. The
discussion infra discusses a few of the court cases that have helped define the balance between
competing congressional and presidential warmaking prerogatives. See Robert F. Turner, The
Constitutional Framework for the Division of National Security Powers Between Congress, the
President and the Courts, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra note 2, at 749-892. Conflict be-
tween Congress and the President over Vietnam led to the constitutionally suspect War Powers
Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2000). The War Powers Resolution is beyond the scope of
this article; however, a discussion of the act can be found in Turner, supra, at 834-45. See also
Edward Keynes, The War Powers Resolution and the Persian Gulf War, in THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 241-56 (David Grey Adler & Larry N. George
eds., 1996).
82 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
83 ld. at 319.
84 See id. at 316 stating:
And since the states severally never possessed international powers, such
powers could not have been carved from the mass of state powers but obvi-
ously were transmitted to the United States from some other source. During
the colonial period, those powers were possessed exclusively by and were en-
tirely under the control of the Crown. By the Declaration of Independence,
"the Representatives of the United States of America" declared the United
[not the several] Colonies to be free and independent states, and as such to
have "full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish
Commerce and to do all Acts and Things Independent States may of right do."
85 Id. at 320.
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and the exercise of inherent presidential power in the realm of international af-
fairs.86
Although expansive, there are some limits on presidential prerogatives
in the international arena under the Curtiss-Wright decision. The leading case
limiting the President's war powers is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer.87 In this case, the threat of a nationwide steel strike in the middle of the
Korean War caused President Truman to issue an executive order directing the
Secretary of Commerce to take possession of most of the nation's steel mills.
88
The Secretary was ordered to keep the steel mills operating and the presidents of
the companies were to serve as operating managers of the mills. 89 The compa-
nies brought suit to declare the President's order invalid and outside the scope of
his authority and for a permanent injunction preventing its enforcement. 90 The
Supreme Court was called upon to decide if the seizure order was within the
constitutional power of the President.9' In holding that the President had ex-
ceeded his constitutional authority, Justice Black, writing for the Court, stated
that "[t]he President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an
act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.' 92 In addition, the Court found
that the President's war powers were not unlimited. The Court held:
[W]e cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold
that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ulti-
mate power as such to take possession of private property in or-
der to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a
job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities.93
Finally, the Court stated that the Constitution is "neither silent nor equivocal"
and expressly limits the President to executing the laws that Congress makes.94
86 See, e.g., War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548; see also Authorization for Use
of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong., 116 Stat. 1498
(enacted).
87 343 U.S. 579 (1952). For a complete history of the Steel Seizure Case, see generally
MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER
(1977).
88 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583.
89 Id.
90 Id.
9' Id. at 584.
92 Id. at 585.
93 Id. at 587.
94 Id. Justice Black ended his opinion by stating, "The Founders of this Nation entrusted the
lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times. It would do no good to recall
the historical events, the fears of power and the hopes for freedom that lay behind their choice."
Id. at 589. This comment by the Court could have been made in the wake of the September 1 Ith
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Judicially limited in Youngstown, the executive branch is also constitutionally
limited by the separation of powers etched into the Constitution's text.
D. The Spending Power and the Budget
1. The Power of the Purse
The framers vested the legislative power of the federal government in
the legislative branch.95  The Constitution is very specific and expansive in
enumerating the powers of Congress, which include the power to lay and collect
taxes, to provide for the general welfare and the common defense, to coin and
regulate money, to declare war, to raise and support an army and provide for a
navy.96 In addition, the Constitution provides that Congress shall have all the
97
nation's law-making powers, while the President has the executive duty to see
that the laws that Congress enacts are "faithfully executed. 98
Perhaps the greatest of the legislative powers given to Congress in the
Constitution is the spending power or, as it is also known, the "power of the
purse."99 Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution states, "No Money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.
.. " "00 By granting the power of the purse to the Congress, the framers sepa-
rated the spending power from the power to execute the laws, thereby creating a
check on the executive's power.1° l Had these two powers been combined in one
branch, the potential for tyranny would be great indeed. 
1 02
terrorist attacks.
95 U.S. CONST. art I, § 1.
96 Id. art 1, § 8.
97 Id. art 1, §8, cl. 18. The Constitution states that Congress has the power "to make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any De-
partment or Officer thereof." Id.
98 Id. art II, § 3.
99 See THE FEDERALIST No. 58 (James Madison). Madison wrote, "This power over the purse
may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution
can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance,
and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure." THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 391
(James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
100 U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, ci. 7. Although the power to appropriate money is very broad, the
power is not unlimited. Indeed, the Supreme Court has struck down congressional appropriations
when they conflict with the Constitution. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), over-
ruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
101 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 58 (James Madison); Robert C. Byrd, The Control of the
Purse and the Line Item Veto Act, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 297, 306 (1998).
102 See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
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Antiquity provides a glaring example of the damage the union of the
power of the purse and the executive can have. During much of the period of
the Roman Republic, the Senate exercised unchallenged domination over all
spending matters. '03 However, the rise of Julius Caesar saw the Senate cede
control of the Roman treasury to the newly anointed Roman Dictator.' °4 This
was a power the Senate never regained, and the next five hundred years saw
Roman dictators exercise the warmaking, spending, and taxation powers without
restraint from a now powerless Senate. 0 5 Continual taxation and war by an all-
powerful executive played a large role in the fall of the Roman Empire.
Revolutionary framers knew of Roman history and of similar battles
over the power of the purse in England.' °6 By vesting the power of the purse in
the legislative branch, the framers assured that the purse would give Congress
an effective means of checking executive power and that the spending power
would be in the hands of the most responsive branch of government.,0 7 Con-
gress exercises its spending power through the budget process.
2. The Budget Process
The power of the purse is exercised through spending laws, which are
developed during the budget process. The development of the federal budget
begins when the executive submits his budget estimates. 10 8 Congress then de-
liberates the executive's proposal, accepting part of it and rejecting others by
incorporating their own policy decisions, and passes the first of two legislative
requirements for budgetary authority. 1°9 This first step is an authorization. 0
Authorization laws are those laws that "establish and regulate spending pro-
grams."' 11 The purpose of authorization laws are to define the nature of a pro-
gram, indicate its purpose, describe under which circumstances money is to
spent, and what methods should be used in operating the program.'12
103 Byrd, supra note 101, at 301.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 301-02.
107 Id. at 306; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 58 (James Madison).
108 BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 77, at 43; see also Budget and Accounting Act of
1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13, 42 Stat. 20 (codified as amended at scattered sections of U.S.C.).
109 BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 77 at 43.
110 Id.
I Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto: A
New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implication for Clinton v. City of New
York, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265, 315 (2001).
112 Id. at 315-16.
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After authorization, Congress enacts a separate appropriation legisla-
tion." 13 Appropriation laws authorize the President to withdraw money from the
treasury." 14 These laws state where in the treasury the money comes from, the
purpose of the appropriation and limits the money provided." 5 Finally, the
President will dutifully spend the authorized and appropriated funds in accor-
dance with congressional policy choices. 116
Perhaps simple on its face, the separation of the power of the purse and
the executive power has caused conflict between the two branches of govern-
ment since the republic began. The fundamental shift in congressional spending
power occurred in 1921 with the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act."
7
First, this Act established the Bureau of the Budget."18 Initially part of the
Treasury Department, in 1970 the Bureau of the Budget's name and functions
were substantially changed when the Bureau became part of the highly influen-
tial Office of Management and Budgeting ("OMB")." 9 In accordance with the
provisions of the Act, the President was given broad managerial controls over
the budget process and now submits a proposed budget estimate to Congress.
20
As federal budgets grew and became increasingly complex, practices
and procedures have developed that allow considerable discretion in budget
allocation to the President.' 2' The most deferential of congressional appropria-
tions are historically those where the President has his greatest authority - na-
113 BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 77, at 43.
''4 Rappaport, supra note I 1l, at 315.
''5 Id. (citing Alexander Hamilton). As Hamilton explained,
The design of the constitution in this provision was as I conceive to secure
these important ends - that the purpose the limit and the fund of every expen-
diture should be ascertained by a previous law. The public security is com-
plete in this particular if no money can be expended but for an object, to an
extent, and out of a fund, which the laws have prescribed.
Alexander Hamilton, Explanation, DAILY ADVERTISER (N.Y.), Nov. 20, 1795, reprinted in 19 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 400, 405 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1973).
116 BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 77, at 43; see also U.S. CONST. art II, § 3.
'17 Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13, 42 Stat. 20 (codified as amended at
scattered sections of U.S.C.).
118 See GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY, supra note 44, at 416.
119 See id. at 417 (stating "new emphasis was placed on the providing departments with advice
on ways to improve their efficiency and to reduce the costs of their operations").
120 Id. at 416.
121 The immense complexities of the federal budget and its process are far beyond the scope of
this article. Indeed, entire books have been written on the subject. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER,
PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER (1975) [hereinafter SPENDING POWER]; BRUCE WETTERAU,
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S DESK REFERENCE ON THE FEDERAL BUDGET (1998).
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tional security and defense appropriations.122 In general, Congress grants presi-
dential discretion in four categories: lump-sum appropriations, reprogramming,
impoundments, and budget transfers. 2 3 For an understanding of the consider-
able discretion the President already has over spending power, these categories
are discussed below.
Lump-sum appropriations are appropriations made for more than one
specific object. 24 This allows funds appropriated for one budget request to be
shifted to a different project. 25 Although the first budget approved by Congress
was passed in a lump-sum format, within a few years, Congress reasserted its
spending power and, in most cases, appropriations were made with line items of
minute appropriations. 126 One exception to this practice was during times of
war when lump-sum appropriations were "expended as the exigencies ... may
require" at the discretion of the President. 27 These practices continued until the
presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt when the sheer size of the federal budget
due to wartime appropriations and government programs necessitated Con-
gress's shift to the current practice of "lump-sum" appropriations. 
18
One type of lump-sum appropriations is contingency funds such as the
Foreign Assistance Act. 129 As can be anticipated, the discretion granted to the
President in contingency funds has allowed spending not imagined or sometimes
even prohibited by Congress. 130  Other types of lump-sum appropriations are
emergency spending131 and drawdown spending. 32 Perhaps one of the most
122 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
123 Budget transfers are defined as "the shifting of funds between appropriations." Peter Ra-
ven-Hansen & William C. Banks, From Vietnam to Desert Shield: The Commander in Chief's
Spending Power, 81 IOWA L. REV. 79, 110 (1995). This type of discretionary presidential spend-
ing authority is only allowed with express congressional enabling language. See id. at 111. For a
complete discussion of budget transfers, see generally id. at 110-14.
124 BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 77, at 69.
125 Id.; see also Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993) ('"he allocation of funds from a
lump-sum appropriation is ... committed to agency discretion .... [T]he very point of a lump-
sum appropriation is to give an agency the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and meet
its statutory responsibilities in what it sees as the most effective or desirable way.").
126 SPENDING POWER, supra note 12 , at xx.
127 BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 77, at 70 (citing Act of Feb. 22, 1862, 12 Stat. 344
(appropriations for the Civil War); Act of Mar. 9, 1898, 30 Stat. 274 (appropriations for the Span-
ish American War)).
128 See Roberts, supra note 77, at 563-64.
129 Foreign Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (1961) (codified as amended at 22
U.S.C. §§ 2151-2431 k (2000)).
130 See generally BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 77, at 70 (describing the use of contin-
gency funds to found the Peace Corps, give a helicopter to then Egyptian President Anwar Sadat,
and the use of CIA contingency funds to fund the Contras).
131 Id. at 71-73.
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readily exploitable types of presidential discretionary funding was "gift author-
ity.' 133 Under the Miscellaneous Receipts statute, 134 all monies collected by the
government must be placed in the treasury absent a statutory exception such as
the gift exception. 135 Under this exception, the Secretary of the Treasury was
allowed to accept gifts from private parties and foreign governments to be used
for national security. 136 After acceptance of the gift, the government could use
the funds for previously unappropriated activities. 137
Another discretionary method of appropriations is known as repro-
gramming. This occurs when an agency asks for item A, and then through a
complicated informal method of gaining congressional approval, uses the funds
to pay for item B. 138 Budget transfers are also allowed between accounts and
agencies if allowed by statutory authority. 39 President Nixon used account
transfers to fund Cambodian bombing by "borrowing" funds from aid programs
and allocating the "borrowed" funds to the bombing campaign. 40 Nixon then
used Department of Defense ("DOD") transfer authority to fund the bombing
after the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam.141
Finally, the President has, at times, spent less than the amount appropri-
ated by Congress for a given period. This is known as impoundment.' 42 There
are two types of impoundments: programmatic and policy-based. 43 Program-
matic impoundments are looked upon with favor by Congress as these im-
poundments are part of the executive's duty to faithfully execute the laws. 44 An
early programmatic impoundment was when President Jefferson saved $50,000
132 Id.
133 Id. at 74.
134 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (2000).
135 See, e.g.,id. § 1321; 5 U.S.C.A. §7342 (2003).
136 See BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 77, at 74-75.
137 Lt. Col. Oliver North used the gift authority to solicit gifts from foreign governments to
fund the Contras contrary to at least the spirit of the Boland Amendments. Id. at 75. The gift
exception has since been repealed. Id.
138 Id. at 76-77.
139 Id. at 77.
'40 Id. at 77-78.
141 Id. at 77-78. Due to Nixon's use of the transfers, Congress enacted explicit statutory lan-
guage to prohibit transfer of funds to spending that had previously been denied by Congress in
1974. Id. at 78.
142 Id. at 79.
143 Id.
'44 Id.
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Congress had appropriated for Mississippi River gunboats after the Louisiana
Purchase ended the French threat to our western border. 
45
Policy-based impoundments occur when the President refuses to spend
appropriated funds, not because of a desire to save money, but because of dis-
agreement with Congress's program.146 It is probably safe to say that Presidents
have disagreed with congressional spending prerogatives since our Constitution
was formed. William Banks and Peter Raven-Hansen, in their book National
Security Law and the Power of the Purse, illustrate examples of policy-based
impoundment controversies during the Truman, 47 Eisenhower, Kennedy, 48 and
Johnson 149 administrations. These examples of the President and Congress
clashing over impoundments were resolved with relatively little fallout. How-
ever, the election of President Nixon would soon change this uneasy constitu-
tional balance.
Almost immediately, President Nixon and his political agenda began to
come into conflict with the Democratically controlled Congress. Nixon used the
power of impoundment to set aside funds Congress appropriated in bills in an
attempt to balance the budget and instead used the funds for programs he
thought should Congress should have funded. 150 This led to the passage of the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 ("Act").' 5 ' This
Act established two permissible types of impoundments the President may
make: rescissions and deferrals. 152 First, the President can rescind, or refuse to
spend, appropriated funds for any reason. 53 However, Congress must approve
this rescission within forty-five days for the rescission to take effect. 54 Second,
the Act allows the President to defer spending appropriated funds for up to one
fiscal year in limited circumstances. 
155
145 Id. (citing 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 11, 14 (1803) (statement of President Jefferson)).
146 Id.
147 Id. at 80. President Truman impounded funds to pay for additional Air Force groups. Id.
148 Id. at 81. Both Eisenhower and Kennedy impounded funds in disagreement over the B-70
bomber program. Id.
149 Id. Similarly, Johnson and Congress had a dispute over construction of nuclear-powered
frigates. Id.
1SO See PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAWS 200-01 (1996).
151 Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.
(2000)).
152 Elizabeth Garnett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and the Line
Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871, 878 (1999).
153 See Loretta Hagopian Garrison, Note, Who Decides? The Struggle for Control over the
Federal Government's Spending Power, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 66, 75 (1988).
154 See id.
155 Id. at 74-75.
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Since the time of the revolution, Congress and the President have con-
sistently fought over the power of the purse. The constitutional provision giving
Congress the spending power has been repeatedly encroached upon by Presi-
dents seeking easier avenues to enact policies and support their unilateral deci-
sions. Usually, presidential intrusions into the spending power have been met
with congressional reactions to reassert control over the nation's purse strings.
However, in spite of congressional efforts, the executive continues to have
broad abilities to circumvent congressional spending prerogatives.
3. The Iran-Contra Affair - A Look at Presidential Assertion of
the Spending Power
The ran-Contra affair is an illuminating example of congressional and
presidential battles over the power of the purse and gives a clear glimpse into
the mechanics of national security funding. The United States' support of the
Contras began in 1981 after the Nicaraguan Civil War when the Sandinistas
gained control of the country. 56 Subsequently, however, congressional support
for the Contras began to wane. Beginning in 1982, Congress enacted the first of
the Boland Amendments, restricting support that could be given to the Con-
tras. 157 Subsequent Boland Amendments to DOD appropriation bills prohibited
the support of any group or individual for the purpose of overthrowing the Sand-
inista government.' 58 The history of the whole affair is very complex as evi-
denced by the three-volume report; Volume I alone contains over 500 pages.
59
However, for purposes of this discussion, the relevant point is that Congress
severely limited - and actually prohibited - all support of the Contras from late
1984 until mid-1985.16o
Congressional restrictions were not in line with President Reagan's idea
of Contra support. President Reagan wanted the Contras supported "body and
soul" regardless of the Boland Amendments.' 6' To accomplish this end, execu-
tive agencies and the DOD ran a variety of budgetary "end-arounds" to circum-
vent Congressional restrictions placed upon United States policy. 1
62
156 See GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY, supra note 44, at 1108.
157 Id.
158 BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 77, at 137.
159 See http://www.namebase.org/sources/WF.html. Volume one contains the report of the
Independent Council, Lawrence E. Walsh. The second volume contains indictments, plea agree-
ments, interim reports to the Congress, and administrative matters, while the third contains classi-
fied information. See id. See generally I LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPEND-
ENT COUNCIL FOR IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS (1992), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocsl
walsh/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2003).
160 See BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 77, at 139.
161 Id. at 159.
162 Id. at 73-79.
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One of the methods the Reagan administration used to circumvent the
Boland Amendments was to solicit contributions from at least ten different for-
eign countries which was then channeled to the Contras.163 Arms sales to Iran
gained over $3 million in funds for the Contras. 64 By the time the dust settled
surrounding the Iran-Contra affair, the President and his followers had used al-
most every tool in the colloquial bag to circumvent Congress's policy limita-
tions including: use of the CIA contingency fund, low oversight black budget
programs, drawdown, reprogramming, and DOD operation and maintenance
accounts to build an airstrip and base. 65 Last but not least, transfer authority
under the Economy Act permitted military equipment to be transferred to the
Contras as "surplus."' 166 The clear message of the Iran-Contra affair is this: the
current loopholes in the budget process allow the President much discretion in
national security spending to take almost any action he deems necessary. Even
in cases where Congress makes explicit national security restrictions in conflict
with Presidential prerogatives, our elected Presidents have shown utter disregard
for their coequal branch of government.
As seen through this history, the power of the purse in the hands of the
people's representatives has lived a circular life. Early on, through the English
and colonial experiences, the legislatures used military emergencies and appro-
priations to wrest civil liberty concessions and control over the power of the
purse from the king. As time progressed into the modem era, military emergen-
cies and national security have been used to retake the power of the purse away
from the Legislature and consolidate that power in the executive and his agen-
cies. Because of this shift in the balance of who controls the spending power,
some judicial measure must be taken to force Congress to reassert its historical
responsibility. Perhaps the best judicial doctrine to force this move is the non-
delegation doctrine or a modern day modification of it.
V. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
Before beginning an in-depth discussion of the nondelegation doctrine,
it might be helpful to clearly state the doctrine at the outset. The nondelegation
doctrine states that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to any other
branch of government without an intelligible principle to which the person or
agency exercising the delegated authority is directed to conform. 
167
163 Id. These solicitations raised approximately $34 million for the Contras. Id.
I64 Id.
165 id. at 170.
166 Id. at 79.
167 J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
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A. Origins of the Doctrine
The Constitution of the United States provides that "[a]ll legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives."'' 68 The legislative
powers carved out in the Constitution were taken from the general mass of legis-
lative powers, leaving those not enumerated in the Constitution to the several
states. 69 These words either prohibit, limit the extent of, or place conditions on
where Congress may delegate its legislative power depending on how much
strength one allows the doctrine. 70 This segment of the separation of powers
stems from the theories of John Locke, who stated that "[t]he power of the legis-
lative, being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant ... [as such]
the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws and
place it in other hands."'
' 7
'
Early cases assessing the extent and conditions under which Congress
could delegate its powers centered on two trains of thought. The first allowed
delegation where Congress granted authority on a preordained condition - the
"contingency theory."'172 As such, Congress allows the President to take a spe-
cific action upon the happening of a specific event.
The second theory that developed permitted legislative delegation to fill
gaps left in statutory language - "the gap filling theory."' 173 As succinctly stated
by the Supreme Court, the gap filling theory of permissible delegation was de-
fined by Justice Taft in J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States 174 where he
penned:
168 U.S. CONST. art I, § I.
169 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936) (citing Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294 (1936)).
170 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692
(1892); CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 52, at 100. Why Congress would want to give
away its legislative powers is a very good question. Some reasons that have been forwarded for
why Congress would want to take these self-depreciating acts are worries about making tough
policy decisions that may affect re-election chances, legislative efficiency, and conflict avoidance.
See Michael J. Mortimer, The Delegation of Law-Making Authority to the United States Forest
Service: Implications in the Struggle for National Forest Management, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 907,
9 17-28 (2002).
171 John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, in THE TRADITION OF FREEDOM:
SELECTIONS FROM THE WRITERS WHO SHAPED THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS OF FREEDOM AND
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 244 (M. Mayer ed., 1957).
172 See, e.g., Field, 143 U.S. 649; Brig Aurora v. United States, II U.S. 382 (1813).
173 See, e.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. I
(1825).
174 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
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"The true distinction, therefore, is, between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion
as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion
as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objec-
tion can be made." . . . [Therefore] if Congress shall lay down
by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or
body authorized to exercise [delegated authority] is directed to
conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of
legislative power.
175
Thereafter, the Court had a defined Constitutional doctrine limiting the ability of
Congress to delegate its power; however, the doctrine had yet to be applied and
given real force. This would change a few years later. The doctrine taken from
the pages of Locke and theoretically discussed by Justice Taft in J. W. Hampton
was given teeth in two cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1935.
B. High Water Mark of the Doctrine
In 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt made a series of executive or-
ders pursuant to the National Industrial Recovery Act ("Act"). 176 These execu-
tive orders tasked the Secretary of the Interior with issuing regulations to carry
out the President's orders.177 These regulations provided, in part, that producers
would have to file a monthly statement under oath concerning the location and
amount of petroleum production, requiring shippers to file an oath declaring
particulars as to deliveries and that all persons under the terms of the Act would
have to make their books and records available for inspection by the Department
of the Interior. 78 The Panama Refining Company, among other oil producers,
filed suit to restrain federal officials from enforcing the Department of the Inte-
rior regulations and challenged the Act as an unconstitutional delegation of the
legislative power to the President. 1
79
The Court found that the subject of the Act was clearly defined; 80 there-
fore, the questions to be answered to determine if the Act was an unconstitu-
tional delegation of the legislative power to the president were "whether the
'75 Id. at 407-09 (quoting Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 312 (1937);
Wilmington & Zanesville R.R. v. Comm'rs of Clinton County, I Ohio St. 77, 88 (1852)).
176 15 U.S.C. §703(c) (2000); see Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 405 (1935).
177 See Panama Ref, 293 U.S. at 407.
178 Id. at 408.
179 See id. at 410-11.
180 In the words of the Court, the Act related to the "transportation in interstate and foreign
commerce of petroleum and petroleum products which are produced or withdrawn from storage in
excess of the amount permitted by state authority." Id. at 414-15.
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Congress has declared a policy with respect to that subject; whether the Con-
gress has set up a standard for the President's action; [and] whether the Con-
gress has required any finding by the President in the exercise of the authority to
enact the prohibition."'' 81 In holding the Act an unconstitutional delegation of
the legislative power, the Court found that the Act established "no criterion to
govern the President's course."'1 82 Furthermore, the Court stated that "as this
section is concerned, it gives to the President an unlimited authority to deter-
mine the policy and to lay down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may
see fit.'
18 3
The Court also addressed the argument that a delegation of legislative
power is to be assumed constitutional by the assumption that the President has
acted and will act for the public good. 184 Assuming that the President did in fact
or would act for the public good is of no consequence; the correct question is
whether there is constitutional authority for the delegation. 85 After reviewing
the founding precepts of the doctrine, 86 the Court found that, in every lawful
delegation that was challenged, there was an intelligible principle that Congress
had laid out either by (1) requiring a finding of fact before the executive may
carry out the legislative policy (the contingency theory) or (2) requiring that the
executive official make regulations to administer the laws Congress has effected
and the policies that Congress has declared (the gap filling theory).1
87
The second case the Court decided, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 188 further defined the boundaries of the nondelegation doctrine.
The facts surrounding the case involved alleged violations of the Live Poultry
Code ("Code"), promulgated under section 3 of the National Industrial Recov-
ery Act, by a New York poultry slaughterhouse. 89 The Code was approved by
the President on April 13, 1934, by executive order and set forth the rules and
regulations concerning the regulation of the poultry trade.' 90 After indictment,
the poultry slaughterhouse challenged the constitutionality of the Code as an
unlawful delegation of Congress's legislative power.191
181 Id. at 415.
182 ld.
83 Id .
184 Id. at 420.
185 Id.
186 See supra notes 136-143 and accompanying text.
187 See Panama Ref., 293 U.S. at 420-30 (discussing United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506
(1911); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. 382 (1813)).
188 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
189 Id. at 519-22.
190 Id. at 523.
191 Id. at 519.
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The Supreme Court again examined the nondelegation doctrine and al-
luded to the holding of Panama Refining stating:
The Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to oth-
ers the essential legislative functions with which it is thus
vested. We have repeatedly recognized the necessity of adapt-
ing legislation to complex conditions involving a host of details
with which the national Legislature cannot deal directly. We
pointed out in the Panama Company Case that the Constitution
has never been regarded as denying to Congress the necessary
resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to
perform its function in laying down policies and establishing
standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the mak-
ing of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the deter-
mination of facts to which the policy as declared by the Legisla-
ture is to apply. But we said that the constant recognition of the
necessity and validity of such provisions, and the wide range of
administrative authority which has been developed by means of
them, cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the au-
thority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be main-
tained.' 92
In this vein, the Court had to look at the challenged statute to determine if Con-
gress had established "standards of legal obligation, thus performing its essential
legislative function," or transferred this responsibility to others. 93 A close ex-
amination of the Recovery Act on which the Code was based led the court to
hold that the Recovery Act was without precedent in its broad delegation of the
legislative function to industry leaders on whose opinion the President based his
Code. 94 In short, neither the (1) contingency theory nor the (2) gap filling the-
192 Id. at 529-30 (citing Panama Ref., 293 U.S. at 421).
193 Id. at 530.
194 See id. at 541-42 stating:
To summarize and conclude upon this point: Section 3 of the Recovery Act is
without precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity.
It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular
states of fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of
prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe
them. For that legislative undertaking, Section 3 sets up no standards, aside
from the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation, correction and expan-
sion described in section one. In view of the scope of that broad declaration,
and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the
President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the
government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfet-
tered. We think that the code-making authority thus conferred is an unconsti-
tutional delegation of legislative power.
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ory of permissible delegation was met by the Industrial Recovery Act. 195 What
the Recovery Act did was delegate the task of making the legislative framework
- the intelligible principle - to industry leaders outside the government; because
the intelligible principle was not set by Congress, the Act was unconstitutional
under either the contingency or gap filling theory. 1
96
Together, these two cases set the boundaries of the nondelegation doc-
trine aptly stated by Justice Taft when he wrote that "[i]f Congress shall lay
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not
a forbidden delegation of legislative power.
' 97
C. Modern Delegation Theory
Despite these strong holdings defining the boundaries of the nondelega-
tion doctrine, the Court has refused to utilize these cases to overturn challenged
congressional legislation since 1935. With no constitutional principle to limit
delegation, the twentieth century saw an immense rise in the number and reach
of executive agencies to "fill up the details" left unmentioned by Congress.
These include, but are in no way limited to, the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. The Court has consistently upheld challenges to the broad mandates of
Congress granting authority to these powerful agencies as constitutional in spite
of the nondelegation doctrine.
98
One such modern case involved a law that granted authority to the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency to promulgate national ambient air quality stan-
dards for pollutants "requisite to protect the public health."' 99 On appeal, the
Court assessed the issue by the conventional delegation doctrine as advanced by
J. W. Hampton and its progeny. First, the majority paid homage to the rule that
congressional grants of authority without intelligible principles are unconstitu-
tional.200 Then, the Court held that the legislative framework in question was
"requisite to protect the public health," forwarded a sufficient intelligible princi-
ple, and thereby upheld the delegation.2°'
195 See id.
196 See id.
197 J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,409 (1928).
198 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 490 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Indus.
Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980); Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n Inc.,
v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974); FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137-38
(1940).
199 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001).
200 Id. at 472.
201 Id. at 474. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, found the intelligible principle by com-
paring the language of the Act to previous allowable delegations. See id. at 473-74. Justice Tho-
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Instead of an anomaly, this case illustrates present-day constitutional
nondelegation interpretation - known as the "intelligible principle test." The
modern doctrine only requires Congress to lay down a very minimal intelligible
principle such as "in the public interest."2 °2 This gundeck 20 3 language will then
pass constitutional muster and be upheld if challenged on nondelegation
grounds. Similarly, agency rulemaking under the broad grant of delegation is
then usually upheld. z 4
Because of the very low hurdle needed to pass constitutional muster,
some commentators have remarked that the doctrine is all but dead.05 True, the
practical needs of government demand that the nondelegation doctrine not be an
inflexible one. As such, a need for flexibility has hastened the doctrine's de-
mise. This flexibility needed for an operative government was understood by
the framers206 and the Supreme Court early on in our nation's history.20 7 The
difficulty in balancing the necessary flexibility and the doctrine was adequately
stated by Chief Justice Taft in 1928:
mas, writing a concurring opinion, stated:
Although this Court since 1928 has treated the "intelligible principle" re-
quirement as the only constitutional limit on congressional grants of power to
administrative agencies, the Constitution does not speak of "intelligible prin-
ciples." Rather, it speaks in much simpler terms: "All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress." I am not convinced that the in-
telligible principle doctrine serves to prevent all cessions of legislative power.
I believe that there are cases in which the principle is intelligible and yet the
significance of the delegated decision is simply too great for the decision to be
called anything other than "legislative." As it is, none of the parties to this
case has examined the text of the Constitution or asked us to reconsider our
precedents on cessions of legislative power. On a future day, however, I
would be willing to address the question whether our delegation jurisprudence
has strayed too far from our Founders' understanding of separation of powers.
Id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations and emphasis omitted).
202 See, e.g., NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
203 "Gundeck" as used above refers to an illicit procedure used by some personnel while mak-
ing rounds (inspections) upon ships while import or at sea. On a ship, various personnel are re-
quired to make rounds of the ship and take various readings such as oil temperatures, gas tank
levels, or bilge levels. These numbers are used to determine if there are any problems in the
ship's machinery. "Gundecking" is when personnel do not make these rounds but merely write in
the previous hour's numbers, thereby preventing an accurate assessment of the ship.
204 See NBC, 319 U.S. at 190.
205 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 132-33 (1980).
206 THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 343 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961)
(stating "the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can
never in practice be duly maintained").
207 See Brig Aurora v. United States, II U.S. 382 (1813).
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The rule is that in the actual administration of the government
Congress or the Legislature should exercise the legislative
power, the President or the State executive, the Governor, the
executive power, and the Courts or the judiciary the judicial
power, and in carrying out that constitutional division into three
branches it is a breach of the National fundamental law if Con-
gress gives up its legislative power and transfers it to the Presi-
dent, or to the Judicial branch, or if by law it attempts to invest
itself or its members with either executive power or judicial
power. This is not to say that the three branches are not co-
ordinate parts of one government and that each in the field of its
duties may not invoke the action of the two other branches in so
far as the action invoked shall not be an assumption of the con-
stitutional field of action of another branch. In determining
what it may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the
extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according
to common sense and the inherent necessities of the govern-
mental co-ordination. °8
It may appear that a working government's need for flexibility and the
rigidity of the nondelegation doctrine are in irreconcilable conflict with each
other. Commentaries have alluded to a type of constitutional tightrope-walk
when dealing with cases of legislative delegation. 20 9 Despite the conflict be-
tween the two principles, a working system evolved almost from the beginning
of our country that allows Congress to pass broad legislation and then allows
agencies and other branches of government to "fill up the details."'2 1° Similarly
stated is the constitutional maxim that Congress can obtain assistance from the
other coordinate branches of government.21' With the growth of executive
agencies in the twentieth century, Congress has increasingly looked to the agen-
cies for help filling in the details due to the shear size of government and a per-
ceived lack of expertise in technical or complex areas. However, this perceived
necessity should not dispense with the previously stated constitutional require-
ment that Congress "lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to
which the person or body authorized to exercise the delegated authority is di-
rected to conform."
212
On multiple occasions, lawyers or judges have attempted to use or re-
vive the nondelegation doctrine to force Congress to pass legislation with true
208 J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,406 (1928).
209 CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 52, at 100.
210 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 43 (1825).
211 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
212 J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409.
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intelligible principles, to no avail.21 3 In addition, the doctrine has had some ef-
fect in lower-level federal courts overturning broad delegations of the legislative
power.214
Even assuming that the doctrine has been weakened to near extinction
and thus has limited application in the present day, a reinvigorated doctrine
could perform three vital functions. First, the doctrine would ensure that impor-
tant social policy decisions are made by the branch of government most respon-
sive to the American people, the Congress.15 Second, as stated above, the doc-
trine would ensure that when Congress does find it necessary to delegate author-
ity, Congress itself would lay down an "intelligible principle" to guide the exer-
cise of its delegated powers.21 6 Last, the nondelegation doctrine ensures that
courts charged with reviewing exercises of congressional delegation will be able
to "test that exercise against ascertainable standards. '217
VI. DELEGATION OF THE SPENDING POWER? SOMETHING HAS TO BE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SOMETIME!
In today's modem age, spending is equivalent to making laws. 2 18 Since
the executive branch can make no laws, 219 the test to determine if an executive
action is equivalent to making law is whether the action has the purpose and
213 See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring); FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559 (1975); Cal. Bakers Ass'n v. Shultz,
416 U.S. 21, 90-91 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963)
(Harlan, J. dissenting).
214 See, e.g., Franklin Township v. Tugwell, 85 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1936). In this case, a fed-
eral court struck down an emergency appropriations bill because it unconstitutionally delegated
legislative power to the President. See id. at 222.
215 See Indus. Union, 448 U.S. at 685 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
216 See id. at 685-86 (citing J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409; Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388,430 (1935)).
217 Id. at 686.
218 See Louis Fisher, The Spending Power, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 8 1, at 228, quoting James Madison and stating:
Madison and other delegates wanted to keep the power of commander-in-chief
separate from the power to finance a war. To protect constitutional liberties,
that liberty had to be reserved to Congress: "Those who are to conduct a war
cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to
be commenced, continued, or concluded. They are barred from the latter by a
great principle in free government, analogous to that which separates the
sword from the purse, or the power of executing from the power of enacting
the laws."
219 For a discussion of executive and legislative powers in relation to lawmaking functions, see
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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effect of altering "the legal rights, duties and relations of persons., 220 Although
the nondelegation doctrine is seemingly dead for all but its most resolute sup-
porters, the time may soon be approaching that the doctrine may have to be re-
vived to prevent Congress from further delegating its power of the purse.
In the haste to create a Department of Homeland Security, the House of
Representatives passed language that would allow the President to transfer up to
five percent of any appropriation in any year between appropriations. 22' This
language shows that Congress stands poised to surrender more of their power of
the purse if confronted with an appropriate threat in the future. Coupled with
present congressional budgetary processes such as lump-sum appropriations,
reprogramming, and contingency funds that show that Congress to a large extent
has already ceded a large portion of their power of the purse to the executive
branch, the union of the executive and legislative power is an increasing threat.
All told, the present state of affairs in Washington, D.C. shows a Congress in-
creasingly willing to give the spending power away and an executive who will
surely not abandon newfound power and right. If the prophetic union of the
sword and the purse is indeed upon us, the only recourse to somewhat reset the
separation of powers is the judiciary. The nondelegation doctrine could serve as
an efficient tool to serve this purpose.
Even though the doctrine could serve as the tool needed to force Con-
gress to make meaningful spending decisions, the Supreme Court has been re-
luctant to utilize the nondelegation doctrine in spending cases in the past. Only
a short time after the 1935 Panama RefininglSchetcher decisions, the Court up-
held a delegation challenge to a statute that gave the President almost unlimited
spending discretion. The Court stated,
This Congress has wide discretion in the matter of prescribing
details of expenditures for which it appropriates must, of
course, be plain. Appropriation and other acts of Congress are
prelate with instances of general appropriations of large
amounts, to be allotted and expended as directed by designated
government agencies .... The constitutionality of this delega-
tion of authority has never been seriously questioned.222
220 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983).
221 Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, §732. For fiscal year 2003, President Bush
requested $38 billion dollars for homeland security, leaving him, if contained in the final bill,
approximately $1.9 billion to transfer at his discretion. See OFFICE OF HOMELAND SEC., THE
WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 64 (2002) [herinafter,
HOMELAND SECURITY], http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat-strat_hls.pdf; see also
THE WHITE HOUSE, SECURING THE HOMELAND STRENGTHENING THE NATION 8, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/homeland-security-book.pdf.
222 Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 312 (1937).
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Similarly, the J.W. Hampton court recognized that the delegation went beyond
"fact-finding" and allowed the President to make discretionary economic judg-
ments and upheld the delegation.223
Although the Supreme Court has been reluctant to do so, there is some
authority from lower courts to use the conventional nondelegation doctrine to
prevent congressional delegation of the spending power.224 In Franklin Town-
ship v. Tugwell,225 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia struck down legislation delegating the power of the purse to the executive.226
At issue in Tugwell was the constitutionality of provisions of the Emergency
Relief Provisions Act of 1935.227 The Act authorized the President to increase
no more than twenty percent "any one or more of the foregoing limitations if he
finds it necessary to do so in order to effectuate the purpose of this joint resolu-
tion."228
It is not surprising that Tugwell, decided shortly after the Panama Refin-
ing and Schechter, based its reasoning and holding on these two cases. The ap-
pellate court measured the Act against the test formulated in Panama Refining:
"whether Congress has declared a policy with respect to the subject; whether
Congress has set up a standard for the President's action; [and] whether Con-
gress has required any finding by the President in the exercise of the authority
conferred., 229  The court found that the Act was clearly an unconstitutional
230delegation of the legislative power. In writing the Act, Congress had not pre-
scribed the duties or responsibilities of the President.231 He was free to spend or
223 See 276 U.S. 394, 410-11 (1928).
224 See Nat'l Cable Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974). In this case, the Court
found it unnecessary to use the delegation doctrine per se; however, it used the principles of the
doctrine to read the challenged statutory language narrowly and avoid a constitutional problem.
"[It] would be a sharp break with our traditions to conclude the Congress has bestowed on a fed-
eral agency the taxing power." Id. at 341.
225 85 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1936). But see Cincinnati Soap., 301 U.S. 308. In Cincinnati Soap,
the Court invalidated a delegation challenge of executive authority over spending. The act in
question allowed the entire proceeds to go to the Philippines "with no direction as to the expendi-
ture thereof." Id. at 312. In Gratiot v. United States, 45 U.S. 80 (1846), the Court stated that "[a]
specific appropriation could not be diverted from its object, but general appropriations necessarily
implied an application according to the discretion of the department." Id. at 114 (emphasis
added).
226 Tugwell, 85 F.2d at 218 (stating "there is a clearly unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power").
227 H.R.J. Res. 117, 74th Cong., 49 Stat. 115 (1935). This joint resolution was not codified but
was set out as a note under 15 U.S.C. § 728, which has since been omitted from the United States
Code. See 15 U.S.C. § 728 (2000).
228 Tugwell, 85 F.2d at 216 (citation omitted).
229 Id. at 217.
230 Id. at 218.
231 See id.
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not spend funds as he saw fit. Furthermore, the court went to great length to
show that it was the President, not the legislature, who was given the power to
set up government agencies, prescribe regulations and rules of conduct, and to
decide "where and when and how, if at all, this enormous sum of money is to be
expended for 'housing.'
232
The Tugwell case, although dealing with the delegation of the spending
power, is weak precedent at best because it was decided only one year after the
Supreme Court used the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate congressional
delegations and, of course, it is only a circuit court opinion. Coupled with the
Supreme Court's holding in Cincinnati Soap a year after Tugwell, Tugwell
makes it no easier to apply the doctrine to compel Congress to set meaningful
budgetary limitations for the executive and reassert its spending prerogatives.
Therefore, some change to the doctrine is necessary to reinvigorate it so that the
doctrine can limit congressional budgetary delegations while at the same time
maintain the flexibility needed to deal with unforeseen and complex problems in
the modern world.
Before any proposed test can be evaluated as being an improvement to
the existing doctrine, there must be some overriding purposes that the doctrine
attempts to reinforce. The nondelegation doctrine's purposes are generally the
three principles forwarded by Justice Rehnquist in his Industrial Union concur-
ring opinion coupled with a few others. Categorized, these standards should be
used to judge any proposed reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine. First and
foremost, any reinvigorated doctrine must reinforce political accountability.2 33
Second, a reinvigorated doctrine must provide guidance for executive/agency
action.234 Third, a new doctrine must provide adequate direction for courts
charged with reviewing exercises of congressional delegation to assess congres-
sional delegations against "ascertainable standards. 235 In addition to these pur-
poses of the nondelegation doctrine, any proposed doctrine must also act as a
safeguard of liberty and advance the rule of law.236 Last, but certainly not least,
any doctrine must allow for continued survival of the modem administrative
state at some level and, in the domestic security arena, allow for protection of
state secrets and defense and law enforcement activities.
232 Id. at 219.
233 See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
234 See id.
235 See id. at 686.
236 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHi. L. REv. 315, 321 (2000).
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A. Intelligible Principles with a Twist
1. The Schoenbrod Doctrine
The rise of the administrative state has seen a resurgence of scholarly
support for a renewed nondelegation doctrine.237 One of the most vehement
proponents of the nondelegation doctrine is Professor David Schoenbrod. 8 He
supports a doctrine that would prohibit delegation of legislative powers granted
in Article I of the Constitution.239  According to Schoenbrod, the legislative
power is the power to make rules of private conduct.24 Schoenbrod implies that
the current "intelligible principle" test allows congressional delegations by dif-
ferences of degree.24' In contrast, his test is one that tests delegations as differ-
ences of kind so that permissive congressional delegation would occur when
Congress enacts laws with a clear understanding of their meaning.24 2 Ergo, un-
constitutional delegation would occur if Congress enacted statutes that affect
private conduct with no clear understanding or customary meaning. 243 For all of
Schoenbrod's arguments, his theory amounts to little more than a slightly differ-
ent rule with slightly stricter enforcement of the "intelligible principle" standard;
as such, Schoenbrod's doctrine, much like any proposed reassertion of the con-
237 See Steven F. Heufner, The Supreme Court's Avoidance of the Nondelegation Doctrine in
Clinton v. City of New York: More than "A Dime's Worth of Difference," 49 CATH. U. L. REV.
337, 359-71 (2000). Heufner outlines increased support of the doctrine by examining the writings
of Justice Rehnquist in Industrial Union, 448 U.S. 607, and American Textile Manufacturers
Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). Heufner, supra, at 359-71. Supporters include Judges
Skelly Wright, Carl McGowan, Lawerence Tribe, Phillip Kurland, Theodoere Lowi, John Hart
Ely, Peter H. Aranson, and others. Id.
238 See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993).
239 See id. at 18 1.
240 See id.
241 See id.
242 See id. at 181-82. Schoenbrod describes his test in action when he writes that
[a] statutory law will always require interpretation. The need for interpreta-
tion comes not just from the ambiguity of language but also from the need to
read statutes in context. As noted in Chapter I, a statute that outlawed "unrea-
sonable" pollution would state a law in a society with a clear understanding of
what constituted unreasonable pollution, because that shared connotation
would provide a basis for interpretation. While statutory laws that require in-
terpretation do not delegate legislative power, Congress would delegate legis-
lative power if it enacted language in the form of a law, but which in fact left
an agency or the courts to decide what conduct was prohibited. For example,
a statute that prohibited "unreasonable" pollution when that term had no cus-
tomary meaning would, functionally, require the courts to develop the law
case by case.
Id. at 182.
243 Id. at 182.
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ventional nondelegation doctrine, has been challenged as too radical and impos-
244
sible to implement and still maintain the administrative state.
Furthermore, the Court recently declined to adopt Schoenbrod's princi-
ples when it refused to utilize its best chance to reinvigorate the nondelegation
doctrine in decades in Clinton v. City of New York.245 Debates raged throughout
much of the 1990s over the deficit and pork spending. One common solution to
these problems was thought to be to grant the President a line item veto, which
the Republican Congress did by passing the Line Item Veto Act of 1996
("LIVA"). 246  Attacked from the start, LIVA was challenged by scholars and
lawyers alike as an unconstitutional delegation of power to the executive.247
However, when the Supreme Court decision of Clinton v. City of New York
came out, LIVA was overturned on Presentment Clause reasoning. 248
LIVA allowed the President to cancel three types of provisions: "(1) any
dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of new direct
spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit., 249  On August 11, 1997, President
Clinton used the new provisions of LIVA to cancel one item of direct spending
affecting a New York City Health Corporation and a limited tax benefit affect-
244 See id. at 174-76. Schoenbrod proposes a twelve-year transition period to prevent legisla-
tive overload as administrative rules are overturned by his nondelegation doctrine which by its
nature would then require legislative enactments. Book Note, Delegation Without Accountability,
108 HARV. L. REV. 751, 754 (1995) (reviewing SCHOENBROD, supra note 238). See generally
Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L.
REV. 775 (1999).
245 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
246 Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (originally codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-692 (Supp. II
1996)), declared unconstitutional by Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
247 See Heufner, supra note 237, at 377.
248 524 U.S. at 423-25. The Supreme Court declined to address the delegation issues of the
Act; however, the district court used the nondelegation doctrine to overturn the Act at trial. The
district court started with the presumption that the Act was constitutional and then found that the
Act violated the Presentment Clause and the doctrine of separation of powers. See City of New
York v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 168, 171 (D.D.C.), afftd, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). Specifically, the
district court held that
[tihe Line Item Veto Act impermissibly crosses the line between acceptable
delegations of rulemaking authority and unauthorized surrender to the Presi-
dent of an inherently legislative function, namely, the authority to perma-
nently shape laws and package legislation. The Act enables the President, in
his discretion, to pick and choose among portions of an enacted law to deter-
mine which ones will remain valid .... Any subsequent amendment of a stat-
ute falls under Congress' responsibility to legislate. The President cannot take
this duty upon himself; nor can Congress relinquish that power to the Execu-
tive Branch.
Id. at 181.
249 2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (Supp. 11 1996), declared unconstitutional by Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
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ing a group of potato growers in Idaho.250 These two groups filed separate suits
challenging the cancellations. 25' The cases were consolidated into one action
and the Supreme Court examined the case under the expedited appeal provisions
of LIVA 2
Since the Court struck down LIVA on Presentment Clause grounds, the
Court declined to address whether the Act was an unconstitutional delegation of
power. 3 Considering that the Court declined to utilize the doctrine in City of
New York, and that only one of the present justices currently subscribes to a
powerful nondelegation doctrine,254 the Court will probably not begin to use the
existing "intelligible principle" test or Schoenbrod's theories to strike down
congressional delegations of power. At least, it is clear that, as presently de-
fined, the nondelegation doctrine has failed to fulfill any of the three purposes
espoused by Justice Rehnquist in his Industrial Union concurring opinion.255
2. An Agency Formatted Intelligible Principle?
Another new approach to the conventional intelligible principle test was
advanced by the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia in American Trucking
Associations, Inc. v. EPA.256 The court found that the statute violated the non-
257delegation doctrine. In reviewing the challenged statute, the court first found
that the statute did not contain an intelligible principle.258 Then, instead of strik-
ing down the statute as unconstitutional, the court looked at the agency's regula-
tion to see if the agency was able to "extract a determinate standard on its own"
250 City of New York, 524 U.S. at 423-25.
251 Id. at 425. The constitutionality of LIVA had previously been challenged by six members
of Congress, who had voted against the Act; however, the Supreme Court remanded the case to
the district court with orders to dismiss because the members of Congress lacked standing due to a
lack of sufficient injury. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997).
252 City of New York, 524 U.S. at 425-28.
253 Id. at 448.
254 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring).
255 Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring). As discussed supra, Chief Justice Rehnquist's three functions of the nondelegation
doctrine are (1) to ensure that important policy decisions are made by Congress, (2) to ensure that
Congress provides the recipient of delegated authority an intelligible principle to guide the exer-
cise of delegated power, and (3) to ensure that courts charged with reviewing congressional dele-
gations will be able to review the exercise of delegated power against ascertainable standards. Id.
Clearly, the long list of broad congressional delegations to the executive show that the current
doctrine has failed to fulfill any of Justice Rehnquist's functions.
256 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Whitman
v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457.
257 Id. at 1033, 1038.
258 Id. at 1034.
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before striking down the agency rule and not the law. 259 In addition to being
overruled by the Supreme Court, this method of assessing delegation cases is
problematic for a renewed nondelegation doctrine. First, the decision does not
place the power to make laws back in the hands of Congress and increase re-
sponsibility in government. Instead of striking down the law, the court allowed
the legislation to stand and merely struck down the rule leaving the executive
agency in the position to interpret the ambiguous language. Second, rules prom-
ulgated under agency direction are subject to the Administrative Procedure
Act's high standards of judicial deference and would limit opportunities for ju-
dicial redress. 260 Last, the method does not help assess conflicts when Congress
delegates legislative power - such as the power of the purse - directly to the
President instead of one of his agencies.
B. State Nondelegation Doctrines
The Constitution guarantees that all fifty states will have a republican
form of government although the exact form of republican government can and
does differ.26' Each state, in turn, has their own constitutional provisions gov-
erning the separation of powers on a state level. Unlike the federal government,
most states impose substantially more limitations on legislative delegation.262
Therefore, an examination of state decisions applying the nondelegation doc-
trine may provide a helpful test to determine the boundaries for a new federal
doctrine.
Increased enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine in the states is due
in large part to express separation of powers clauses incorporated into state con-
263
stitutions. The principles of separation of powers are expressed in three basic
approaches. 264  A majority, thirty-five states, have strict separation of power
259 Id. at 1038. The reasoning of this case is somewhat in conflict with the holding of AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999). In AT&T Corp., while not assessing the rule
under the nondelegation doctrine, the Court let stand the questioned statute and ruled the agency
interpretation and subsequent rule promulgation unreasonable under the two-part Chevron test.
Id. at 397; see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (holding that the proper test for assessing agency interpretations of legislation was to first
determine if a provision is ambiguous and then, if so, to ascertain if the agency's interpretation
was reasonable).
260 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2000).
261 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government .... ).
262 Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of
Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1172 (1999).
263 Id. at 1190. Rossi also attributes increased enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine to
lingering antifederalist feelings. Id.
264 Id.
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clauses in their constitutions.265 The minority of states have only a general sepa-
ration of powers clause 266 or none at all.
267
While strict separation of power clauses in state constitutions may pro-
vide a reason for increased influence of the nondelegation doctrine in state
courts, there is no real connection between the enforcement of the doctrine and
the type of separation of powers clause in the state constitution. 268 Very few
states follow a weak delegation model that upholds legislative delegations so
long as there are agency procedural safeguards to prevent unrestrained exercise
of delegated power.269  Conversely, most states either follow a moderate or
strong nondelegation doctrine.27 Many of the moderate states, like the federal
"intelligible principle" test, allow delegations so long as there is some combina-
tion of general legislative policy and/or procedural safeguards to limit the scope
of the delegation.27' Strong states on the other hand usually require some level
of specific standards to guide the delegatee.
272
Despite the fact that state courts are more inclined than federal courts to
overturn legislation as an overbroad delegation of the legislative power, the state
doctrines do not supply a realistic test for the federal courts to adopt because
states that use a moderate approach to delegation challenges usually apply some
variation of the failed "intelligible principle" test utilized by the federal gov-
ernment. Conversely, the strong state nondelegation doctrines lack the flexibil-
ity required to maintain a large and diverse federal government.
C. Delegation Canons
The decline of the nondelegation doctrine since its zenith in the 1930s
has not reduced the doctrine to a mere nullity. Rather, the doctrine has been and
is still used in a very diminished capacity as a judicial canon.273 By using the
doctrine as a canon, the Court gives challenged statutes a narrow construction to
avoid constitutional conflicts. 274 Instead of one all-inclusive canon stating a
265 Id. at 1191; see, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. Ill, § 3; W. VA. CONST. art. V, § 1.
266 Rossi, supra note 262, at 1191 (noting five states have general clauses).
267 Id. (noting ten states have no separation of powers clauses).
268 Id. ("The approaches of the state courts vary, even where constitutional texts are sometimes
similar or identical.").
269 Id. at 1191-92 (six states follow such an approach).
270 Id. at 1192-120 1.
271 Id. at 1201; see, e.g., Dep't of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 398 S.E.2d 567, 571-72 (Ga. 1990)
(upholding "public interest" as a sufficient standard for constitutional delegation).
272 Rossi, supra note 262, at 1193-98.
273 See, e.g., ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 27 (2d ed.
2001).
274 See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980) ("A construction
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prohibition of congressional delegations, the doctrine, when used as a canon, is
more aptly viewed as a broad category of judicially imposed limitations based
on specific examples.275 Some of these guiding judicial principles are that agen-
cies are not permitted to interpret statutes so that they would raise constitutional
concerns or in such a way as to preempt state law.276 In the realm of criminal
law, criminal statutes are construed in the favor of the criminal defendant in
accordance with the rule of lenity.277 Other principles limiting interpretation of
congressional delegations include a prohibition on agencies from applying stat-
utes outside the territorial borders of the United States or unfavorably to Native
27Americans.   Finally, there are a few public policy based canons invoking
nondelegation principles including the narrow construction of exemptions from
taxation.
In other cases, courts use nondelegation canons to limit congressional
delegations. An example case from the Fifth Circuit shows this type of use of
the nondelegation doctrine as a general canon. In the early 1980s the Interstate
Commerce Commission modified the Motor Carrier Fuel Surcharge Program to
require carriers to reimburse owner-operators for their fuel costs. 280 When chal-
lenged, the Commission defended the rule based upon a broad reading of the
Interstate Commerce Act ("Act")28' while ignoring other provisions of the
Act.282 The Court examined the agency interpretation and found that, although
Congress had delegated considerable powers to enforce the provisions of the
Act, the Act was not a general grant of authority to regulate all motor carrier
of the statute that avoids this kind of open-ended grant should certainly be favored."); FUNK ET
AL., supra note 75, at 481. Another work advocates using canons somewhat differently to refor-
mulate the intelligible principles doctrine. The forwarded canons are: (I) intelligible principles
should be present in the language of the statute itself; (2) if possible, the court should interpret
statutory language in a way that renders the statute constitutional; (3) Congress should establish a
baseline to measure agency action; and (4) standards should be as reasonably precise as the sub-
ject matter requires or permits. See Jeffery A. Wertkin, Note, Reintroducing Compromise to the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 90 GEo. L.J. 1055, 1081 (2002). The work also addresses potential
problems with this method. Id. at 1085.
275 See generally Sunstein, supra note 236.
276 Id. at 331.
277 Id. at 332.
278 Id. at 333.
279 Id. at 334.
280 See Cent. Forwarding, Inc. v. ICC, 698 F.2d 1266, 1269 (5th Cir. 1983).
281 49 U.S.C. § 10321(a) (repealed 1978) (current version in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.);
Cent. Forwarding, 698 F.2d at 1274.
282 See Cent. Forwarding, 698 F.2d at 1274. Agencies frequently emphasize broad readings of
rule enabling acts while ignoring the detailed provisions. See AMAN, JR. & MAYTON, supra note
273, at 28.
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affairs.283 To read the Act in accord with the agency interpretation "would make
superfluous much of the rest of the ...Act, with its detailed guidelines and
delegations of authority."284
The use of the nondelegation doctrine as a canon in this case shows that
the nondelegation canon does not place a limit on permissible congressional
delegation; rather, the nondelegation canon would require that, upon challenge,
a reviewing court would read the challenged legislation in whatever way neces-
sary to avoid running afoul of the nondelegation doctrine.
This use of the nondelegation "canon" is a second best option if the only
other option is the current "intelligible principle" test. First, the nondelegation
''canons" test is scattered and forwards no sustainable overarching analysis to
employ. Instead, the "canons" are at best very limited constraints on congres-
sional delegations in specific areas of the law. Second, the use of the doctrine as
a canon lacks the strength to force Congress to make meaningful policy choices,
thereby increasing political accountability and protecting civil liberties. Finally,
the "canon" test approach is limited by merely being a discretionary canon that
judges can choose to use or not to use and therefore does not adequately protect
the power of the purse.285
D. A New Standard
It has been argued that all levels of congressional delegation should be
measured against the same standard.286 In accord with the post New Deal dele-
gation decisions, courts have applied the same "intelligible principle" test to
delegations of congressional spending power.287 However, a heightened stan-
dard for cases involving the delegation of Congress's most important check on
executive power - control over the nation's purse strings - is necessary to en-
sure the democratic framework on which our country was founded. This is
based upon the very real maxim that the ability to appropriate is the power to
283 Cent. Forwarding, 698 F.2d at 1277.
284 Id. at 1284.
285 A "canon," or more specifically, a "canon of construction" is defined as "[a] rule used in
construing legal instruments, esp[ecially] contracts and statutes." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 198
(7th ed. 1999). A few jurisdictions have codified the canons of construction; however, "most
jurisdictions treat the canons as mere customs not having the force of law." Id. As such canons
are merely discretionary and judges can pick and choose between competing canons in making
their decisions. See generally, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Deci-
sion and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401
(1950).
286 See Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 222-23 (1989) ("We find no sup-
port, then, for Mid-America's contention that the text of the Constitution or the practices of Con-
gress require the application of a different and stricter nondelegation doctrine in cases where Con-
gress delegates discretionary authority to the Executive under its taxing power.").
287 See, e.g., Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 312 (1937).
[Vol. 106
44
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 106, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol106/iss2/9
THE NEW POST 9/11 AMERICA
28
make laws.288 Money is the backbone of any legislation, especially in the na-
tional security arena. Whereas legislation in arenas like civil rights can legiti-
mately change laws and the rights and responsibilities of people, national secu-
rity laws, policy, and programs are driven by the need for money to pay for per-
sonnel, equipment, and operations. As seen in historical examples like the close
of the Vietnam conflict, when Congress cuts off funding the troops will soon
come home.289
If one accepts the proposition that a new nondelegation standard is
needed for certain arenas, a working model must be developed for courts to ap-
ply. A well-defined constitutional model with tiered approaches is found in the
numerous Supreme Court cases dealing with equal protection. As identified by
the Court in equal protection cases, there are three levels of review: strict scru-
tiny, middle-level review, and rational basis review. 290 Strict scrutiny applies to
suspect classifications 29' or statutes that impair fundamental rights.292  When
interpreting these types of cases, the government must have a compelling gov-
ernment purpose; in practice, when the Court applies strict scrutiny the statute is
almost always found unconstitutional.293
Middle-level review has only been applied in a few cases where the
classification is "semi-suspect." 294 When a classification is categorized as such
the Supreme Court has required the means utilized by the government to be sub-
stantially related to an important governmental objective.295
The lowest level of classification review is ordinary or "rational basis"
review. 96 The Court applies this standard to all classifications that are not sus-
pect or semi-suspect and statutes that do not infringe on fundamental rights.297
As such, to pass constitutional scrutiny, the test only requires that the classifica-
288 Cf Fisher, supra note 218, at 228 (citing 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 148 (Galliard
Hunt, ed. 1900)) ("They are barred from the latter by a great principle in free government, analo-
gous to that which separate the sword from the purse, or the power of executing from the power of
enacting laws.").
289 See id. at 23 1.
290 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 529 (200 1).
291 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (national origin); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886) (race).
292 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate migration); Harper v. Va.
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (use
of the courts).
293 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 290, at 529.
294 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (gender); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S.
456 (1988) (illegitimacy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender).
295 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 290, at 529.
296 See id.
297 See id. at 529-530.
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tion bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.29 When
the courts apply this test the government action is almost always upheld as con-
stitutional.2 99
Applying these levels of scrutiny to delegations of congressional power
would be relatively easy. First, an ordinary review could be applied to most
cases of congressional delegation of legislative power. This test would be very
deferential to congressional delegations and would fundamentally be the same
"intelligible principle" test that the court currently applies. Together with pre-
sent delegation canons, this standard would uphold most congressional delega-
tions and serve as adequate protection in necessary areas. 30
A middle-level of review should then be applied to cases where Con-
gress delegates its spending power except for those cases where the spending
relates to domestic security. This heightened level of review is necessary to
ensure the perpetual separation of the power of the purse from the power to exe-
cute the laws in accordance with the framers' constitutional mandates necessary
to preserve liberty. The Court should only uphold those cases where the delega-
tion is coupled with a substantially defined intelligible principle, which provides
the executive branch with boundaries within which it could permissively oper-
ate.
Finally, in cases involving delegation of the "domestic security ' 30
power of the purse, the Court should support a test akin to the strict scrutiny test
298 See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); United States R.R. Retirement Bd.
v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
299 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 290, at 530.
300 See supra notes 273-285 and accompanying text.
301 "National Security" is hard to define; however, one of the classical conceptions of national
security is "safety from foreign coercion or intimidation." Frederick S. Tipson, National Security
and the Role of Law, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra note 2, at 3, 3; see also THE FEDERALIST
No. 23, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) ("The circumstances
that endanger the safety of nations are infinite."). "Domestic Security" may be even harder to
define since it blends all aspects of National Security with the purely domestic missions of law
enforcement such as crime prevention. In addition, "Domestic Security" includes protection of
critical infrastructure and key resources. See, e.g., 6 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 2003). The
federal government has defined "Homeland Security" as "a concerted national effort to prevent
terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and mini-
mize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur." See HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note
221, at 48. "Terrorism" is further defined as an act that
is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure
or key resources; and is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or
of any State or other subdivision of the United States; and appears to be in-
tended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of
a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a gov-
ernment by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.
6 U.S.C.A. § 101. "Domestic Security" as used in this paper is defined as safety of the American
population and government from coercion from domestic attacks of terrorism designed to coerce
or intimidate the government and citizens of the United States.
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applied in equal protection cases. This near fatal level of review is necessary
because of the dire consequences to liberty that unrestrained delegation of the
domestic security power of the purse to the executive might have. Where most
delegations will allow for new regulations to be promulgated to "promote the
public welfare," the union of the domestic security power of the purse with the
executive power can have immediate consequences to civil liberties on a na-
tionwide scale. Therefore, the domestic security power of the purse should re-
main in the most open and politically divisive branch of government to prevent
reactionary restraints on liberty rather in the hands of a single executive.
However, in examining delegations of domestic security spending pre-
rogatives, any test will have to safeguard the inherent secrecy necessary for the
common defense. 30 2 Therefore, this highest level of scrutiny would allow Con-
gress two acceptable avenues of appropriation. First, Congress could write spe-
cific statutory language 30 3 or, second, Congress, for operations and agencies in
need of the highest level of security, could saddle executive agencies with strict
reporting requirements that would both increase executive accountability and
preserve congressional control over the power of the purse.
This standard is also more in line with constitutional provisions separat-
ing the war making powers between the branches. The President is given the
duty of acting as the Commander-in-Chief 05 impliedly resting on the proposi-
tion of standing and fully funded armed services. Congress, on the other hand, is
given the authority to declare war3°6 and to provide for the Army and Navy.30 7
By requiring a higher standard for delegation of the domestic security power of
the purse, the courts could set limitations on what Congress is allowed to abdi-
cate and protect American civil liberties.30 8
302 There is nothing more basic to the proper functions of national security and the armed
forces than secrecy. Hence the maxim, "Loose lips sink ships." To protect the veil of secrecy,
presidents have resisted both public disclosure and disclosure to Congress. See generally SHANE
& BRUFF, supra note 56, at 137-84.
303 Such as "$55 million for U.S. Coast Guard Patrol Boat replacement."
304 An example of this type of allowable language would read as follows: "all funds allocated
and unspecified in this Act shall be subject to review by the Senate Armed Forces Committee."
This type of oversight by Congress is already in place in the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. See SHANE & BRUFF, supra
note 56, at 923-24.
305 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. I.
306 Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11.
307 Id. art. I, § 8,cl. 11-12.
3 Despite the dramatic shift in civil liberties that occurred with the passage of the PATRIOT
Act, the administration is seeking more power including a review, and possible change, of the
laws regarding the use of military personnel to enforce law enforcement, more commonly known
as the posse conitatus. See HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 221, at 48.
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Furthermore, a heightened standard for measuring the constitutionality
of spending power delegation cases would allow for continued acceptance of
broad delegations of congressional power that would sustain the modern admin-
istrative state while at the same time forcing a pressured or unwilling Congress
to protect its own power of the purse. The new standard would only apply to
cases where, in the language of a statute, Congress grants the President spending
authority in the domestic security arena leaving the President "an unlimited au-
thority to determine the policy.., as he may see fit. 30 9
The proposed test applied to the controversial House language contain-
ned in the draft PATRIOT Act could be assessed as follows. Someday in re-
sponse to a future catastrophe or attack, the President establishes a new agency
within the Department of Homeland Security and, in response to the attack,
Congress amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to reincorporate the pro-
posed House language that would have allowed the President to shift up to five
percent of the appropriated amounts between appropriations. Shock and anger
to the future attack precipitates Congress's increasing counter-terrorism funding
to unprecedented levels hypothetically doubling the Fiscal Year 2003 funding of
$38 billion. This would leave the President the authority to shift almost $4 bil-
lion between executive prerogatives.
Similar to the Iran-Contra affair, the President then follows a course of
action either expressly or impliedly prohibited by Congress such as implementa-
tion of a National ID card.310 By diverting funds under the transfer authority,
the President provides funding to implement the National ID card. Since, the
establishment of the ID card infringes upon the civil liberties of the American
citizenry, the amended Homeland Security Act and the ID program, when chal-
lenged, would be declared an unconstitutional delegation of Congress's spend-
ing power due to the absence of specific congressional language authorizing this
expenditure or language providing for congressional oversight.3"
VII. CONCLUSION
The history of our country is replete with conflict - both on the fields of
war and in our courts. All too frequently war, or a national emergency, causes
the fight at the front to merge with the fight in front of the bench. Time has seen
the steady erosion of the delicately wrought separation of powers crafted by the
framers and the encroachment of guaranteed civil liberties by an ever-expanding
federal government. This steady march has progressed to the point where, in the
name of national security and expediency, the Congress, the people's represen-
.09 Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,415 (1935).
310 The establishment of a National ID card was expressly prohibited in the Homeland Security
Act.
311 Though rough, this example serves merely as a skeleton of constitutional analysis. Further
boundaries and actual application would be left to later authors.
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tatives, have seriously considered an express delegation to the President of the
United States their most dearly won and effective check on executive tyranny -
a the spending power. But for the fighting of a few resolute senators, such as
Robert C. Byrd, the President would have been given the discretion to transfer
funds between agencies, departments and programs at will. Truly, as Justice
Cardozo prophetically said so many years ago, "The delegated power of legisla-
tion which [would have] found expression in this code [the proposed Homeland
Security Act] is not canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing. It is
unconfined and vagrant."3"2
The Senate's changes deleted the offending provisions in the House
Homeland Security bill; however, the next time, our Constitution may not be so
lucky. Someday, probably not today, and probably not tomorrow, America will
be attacked again. Again, a President will denounce the attacks and ask for
measures to combat the next Hitler, Saddam or Bin Laden. And once again, in a
moving display of unilateral patriotism, our Congress will cede more discretion,
more power to the executive branch at the expense of our civil liberties and/or
our Constitution. Considering the real threats to domestic civil liberties and
constitutional balance posed by unlimited presidential spending to combat
transnational threats, some sort of reinvigoration of the nondelegation doctrine
is not too much to ask. If nothing else, history has taught us that national emer-
gencies are when liberty needs to be most vigilantly defended. For as Benjamin
Franklin warned, "They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little tem-
porary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." 313 When the choice is made,
America should stand prepared to choose liberty.
Woodrow E. Turner*
312 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (Cardozo, J.,
concurring).
313 THE ELECTRIC FRANKLIN, THE QUOTABLE FRANKLIN, at http://www.ushistory.org/franklin/
quotable/quote04.htm (last visited Nov. I, 2003).
J.D. Candidate, West Virginia University College of Law, May 2004; B.S. United States
Coast Guard Academy, 1996. The author would like to thank Professors Robert Bastress and
Grace Wigal for their assistance in the preparation of this Article. The author would also like to
thank and dedicate this Article to his father, Larry E. Turner, who gave him his love for both the
Constitution and liberty.
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